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Abstract 
 
An overall plant condition assessment that included a plant integrity 
assessment and maintenance review has been conducted on Duvha Power 
Station Units 1 to 6 Generators. Plant process parameters revealed 
instrumentation errors and discrepancies between plant gauges and the 
operator’s mimic across all units. Various parameters were also found not to 
be correctly set to design specifications. The plant integrity assessment 
supported by input streams from monitored, inspection and feature findings 
are then combined to develop an assessment of the unit’s sub-components 
condition which are then summed to obtain an overall assessed condition 
score. A criticality review then develops the sub component analysis and 
assessed condition score to achieve a ranked sub component score. Unit 4 
was found to have the highest overall condition and criticality assessed score. 
Units 1, 3, 4 and 5 outage plans are in line with the assessment 
recommendations. Recommendations, classified in terms of immediate, short 
and long term actions, are then made based on the findings.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Due to the present shortage of power that South Africa is experiencing, it was 
decided that an assessment of Duvha Power Station’s generators be performed, to 
ensure safe, reliable and continuous operation of their units.  
 
The author’s contribution to the plant assessment was to conduct a plant walk down 
to obtain an understanding of the individual units present operational conditions when 
compared to their design specifications. Subsequently the author was responsible to 
conduct an analysis of the required input streams for process indicator, inspection 
condition and features for an analytical assessment tool. This tool was used to 
facilitate the analysis process of the author’s findings in a manner that would easily 
allow interpretation and presentation of the results.  
 
The output from the tool for the individual units overall assessed conditions was then 
developed further, by the author, by including operational risk in order to obtain a 
ranked criticality order for the sub-components across all six Duvha generators. 
Thereafter a review of Duvha Power Station’s maintenance regime was conducted by 
the author and compared to the findings from the assessment. 
 
This report provides the findings from the assessment of the main generator units at 
Duvha Power Station and has been compiled based on the following assumptions: 
 
• The operating regime will not change and will remain as a base-load station. 
• The output capacity of the main generators will not be increased. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Statistics on Generator Failures  
 
According to a study published by VGB PowerTech in November 2005, the main 
failure areas on generators are stator (45%, see figure 1 for details) and rotor (45%, 
see figure 2 for details) [1].  
 
Figure 1. Generator Stator Events [1] 
 
 
Figure 2. Generator Rotor Events [1] 
 
Majority of the stator failures are due to deficiencies within the winding or the 
insulation system. One third of the rotor events are due to failures in relation to the 
rotor winding.  
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It is important to note that most of these effects can be detected by a diagnostic or 
monitoring system. An example of one method would be is carry out a Failure Mode 
Effect Criticality Analysis (FMECA), which identifies main known failure modes and 
evaluates probability and impact [1]. One Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), 
ALSTOM, has carried out a detailed FMECA for its generator fleet. The data from 
such an analysis has been used in assessing Duvha Power Station’s generators; 
refer to section 6, Plant Integrity Assessment. 
 
2.2. Generator Maintenance Strategies 
 
Eskom Power Stations conduct their turbine generator maintenance on a time-based 
strategy. After a certain number of operating hours an inspection is scheduled. This 
is the traditional approach to generator maintenance. Most power stations in Europe 
and the United States of America have adopted a new approach to maintaining their 
generators. This new approach is entitled Condition Based Maintenance (CBM).  
 
Eskom, thus far, has not been forced to adapt to such a maintenance regime, due to 
the fact that it is not competing against any other power producing competitors. 
However the increasing cost pressure in a de-regulated global energy market is 
forcing power stations, in such markets, to reduce their production costs for electrical 
energy [2]. This also increases the pressure on the power stations to reduce their 
maintenance and spares holding related costs. This resulted, in the past 15 years, 
showing significant changes in the maintenance regimes of the power stations in 
almost all countries [1]. All power stations would like to increase their power output 
and efficiency. This is not only a wish but also a vital requirement if the power 
stations are to increase their plant’s competitive position in the market.  
 
Three main parameters exist for power stations [1]: 
• Reliability – Run the plant on highest efficiency with minimised risk of 
unforeseen incidents. 
• Availability – Deliver contracted supply of power at all times. 
• Maintainability – Conduct outages and shut downs at lowest possible cost. 
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The three parameters will inherently conflict which each other. One way to overcome 
this and to make the station competitive is to maximise knowledge about the station’s 
past and current operational condition, as will be seen in the conclusion chapter of 
this report, for Duvha Power Station. Another way would be to change the station’s 
maintenance approach, i.e. changing from Time Based Maintenance (TBM) to 
Condition Based Maintenance (CBM). 
 
It is important to mention that power stations apply different maintenance 
methodologies depending on the type of power station and the specific operational 
requirements for their generators. For example, a nuclear power station with 
requirements of fixed outage schedules with the critical path of the outage linked to 
refuelling will have different maintenance requirements compared to an industrial 
power producer or coal-fired power station.  
 
Reduced maintenance costs can be achieved by reducing the outage duration and/or 
extending the outage intervals. To fulfil these requirements without losing a high 
availability rate, a combination of preventive and predictive maintenance strategies is 
needed. 
 
2.2.1. Preventive and Predictive Maintenance Strategy 
 
There are two main types of periodic inspections: 
 
• Minor Inspection – Rotor stays in place (rotor-in-situ) 
For a minor inspection, the end covers are removed and bearings 
dismantled but the rotor stays in place. The inspection is limited to the 
accessible parts, such as brush gear, slip-rings or rotating exciter and stator 
end winding. 
• Major Inspection – Rotor removed 
For a major inspection the main requirement is to remove the rotor. 
Thereafter, end covers, bearings, brush gear and coolers are removed or 
dismantled to allow a comprehensive inspection to be performed. 
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Figure 3. Maintenance main tasks and generator status condition for Preventative and 
Predictive Strategy [1] 
 
It is recommended by [1], that the 5 steps from figure 3 be covered by detailed work 
scopes which include: 
1. On-line measurement before shutdown 
Operational data checks, shaft-voltage (AC and DC), inter-turn shortage, 
auxiliaries system check (seal oil, gas, water, etc.). 
2. Disassembly inspections 
Recording of quality measurements like machine settings, shaft alignment, 
mechanical inspections of specified critical parts. 
3. Generator diagnostic and electrical tests 
Slot wedge tightness, bump test, insulation resistance, loss factor 
measurement, contact coefficient measurement, video endoscopic 
inspection, protection systems test, etc. 
4. Reassembly inspections 
Tightness tests, DC-high voltage tests, shaft alignment, mechanical tests. 
5. On-line final tests 
Check of rotor earth fault protection, auxiliaries’ logic sequence, AVR test, 
gas consumption, etc. 
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2.2.2. Time-Based Maintenance vs. Condition-Based Maintenance 
 
Time-Based Maintenance (TBM) is presently the manner in which Eskom conduct 
maintenance on its generators and is normally the approach described in the 
station’s operation and maintenance manuals. Pure TBM strategy has the 
advantages of: 
• Predictability of the actions 
• Standardised packages 
• Controlled scope of work 
 
Disadvantages of TBM are situations where unforeseen incidents, findings or results 
appear. TBM only applies during standstill of the generator, thus no indication can be 
given while in operation. Even if desired, TBM inspections can not give information 
on-line about the current condition of the generator. 
 
Figure 4 from [1] illustrates the differences between TBM and CBM. It makes mention 
of an on-line diagnostic product called AMODIS®, which will be discussed later. 
 
Figure 4. TBM vs. CBM [1] 
 
Increased competition between power producers operating in a competitive market 
has forced them to optimise these maintenance methodologies. Presently, Eskom 
Power Stations do not compete with one another but this may change once 
independent power producers enter the market or if Eskom Power Stations are 
forced to compete against each other.  
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To benefit from the full cost saving potential of an overall plant maintenance strategy, 
[1] states that long-term trending together with on-line monitoring techniques should 
be used. In addition, use of the “three pillar concept”, see figure 5, extended outage 
intervals and shorter outage durations, should be implemented. 
 
 
Figure 5. Quality of Real-Time Condition Assessment [1] 
 
The application of CBM requires various basic elements according to figure 6 [3], for 
a reliable diagnostic decision to be made. Figure 6, gives emphasis to the knowledge 
infrastructure needed and to the general process of diagnostic decision making. 
 
 
Figure 6. Knowledge infrastructure needed for a diagnostic decision making process within 
CBM strategies [3] 
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The following key elements are considered essential for a CBM process to be 
achieved [1]:  
1. On-Line Measurement 
Data retrieved from continuous monitoring providing information of the 
equipment condition during service. 
2. Diagnostic Parameters 
A set of appropriate parameters, derived from the original measured data. 
3. Catalogue of Typical Failure Modes 
A catalogue / database containing detailed information about specific 
generator failures and effects in context to it. 
4. Know-How 
Design, system and material knowledge for generator assessment. 
5. Diagnostic Database 
A large expert knowledge base reflecting decision-making processes and 
unit history information. 
6. Decision Rules 
Clear criteria’s that provide an unambiguous assessment of equipment 
condition, based on the information available. 
7. Unit Signature 
The established condition of the unit for baseline so that comparison from 
that established condition and trending can be accomplished. 
 
Consolidation and subsequent reviewing of data of the 7 points above, makes it clear 
that the application of CBM is a demanding task. The key however, is to proceed 
efficiently and to effectively process the huge amount of information, virtually in real 
time, within advanced CBM strategies.  
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Figure 5, illustrates a basic methodology for the quality of real-time condition 
assessment. It explains that known and unknown weaknesses of the generator’s 
major components needs to be identified and the stress factors, i.e. Temperature, 
Electrical, Ambient conditions and Mechanical stresses, referred to as TEAM, are to 
be monitored. 
 
2.3. Monitoring Systems 
 
2.3.1. An approach by ABB to Predictive Maintenance Strategy 
 
In a paper by T. Bertheau, M. Hoof, and T. Laird [4], common methods used by ABB 
for conducting partial discharge measurements, as a key tool in predictive 
maintenance strategies are discussed. Special attention is given to on-line monitoring 
and the generation of alarms. Bertheau, Hoof, et al, explains that for many years, all 
maintenance was done using a time-based maintenance strategy and defines time-
based maintenance as after pre-defined periods of time, that are based on hours of 
operation and number of start/stop cycles, that an off-line inspection be performed. 
 
The paper by Bertheau, Hoof, et al states that power stations are now employing the 
more cost-effective approach, that being condition-based maintenance. The paper 
focuses on permanent on-line partial discharge measurements as an important 
additional tool to enable condition-based maintenance strategies to be applied. This, 
according to ABB, can be achieved by efficient trending of the partial discharge 
behaviour. ABB developed a data storage method that provides both, an efficient 
Long Time Storage (LTS), without storing too much data and a Short Time Storage 
(STS) without compromising data quality and accuracy. 
 
The ABB Trend-Analysis Program (within the PD monitoring system) generates a 
Level Alarm, when certain pre-defined warning or alarm levels are exceeded, based 
on the data from the STS. A Trend Alarm is generated by the PD monitoring system 
when a dangerous change of PD activity is detected, based on the LTS data. 
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If an alarm is generated, the machine does not have to be shut down immediately [4]. 
Usually there is enough time for a manual PD data analysis to be performed. 
 
2.3.2. ALSTOM’s Tool for Improving Generator Availability 
 
Maintenance, according to pre-defined time intervals, is being replaced by condition 
based maintenance [5]. However, [5] explains that for key components like the 
generator, that it is not only necessary to obtain a reliable assessment of the actual 
state of the machine from diagnostic investigations, but also to estimate the 
remaining life and failure probability of the machine. Refer to the following sections: 
 
2.3.2.1. Fundamental Concept of Lifetime Assessment 
 
A process concept by ALSTOM, called Lifetime Assessment, which is based on 
experience, design and system knowledge, is described in [5]. The fundamental 
concept of the Lifetime Assessment is that, as a machine becomes older, the various 
degradation processes, and above all, their interactions, play a decisive part for the 
reliability and thus for the remaining life of the individual components. The idea, 
therefore, behind the Lifetime Assessment is to find these endangered components 
and to introduce specific countermeasures. 
 
In the past, investigations and test methods were developed in the diagnostics field 
to determine the condition of machine components and assess their state of ageing 
[5].  The rapid advances made in computer and information technologies since then, 
now allows computer systems to utilise extensive “Data Mining” fields [5], to perform 
extensive diagnostic and statistical analyses. 
 
The Lifetime Assessment combines different ageing models for the individual stress 
factors in order to produce the best possible model of the generator with reference to 
the expected remaining life. Figure 7, shows an overview of the components involved 
in the Lifetime Assessment concept. 
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Figure 7. Schematic diagram for the Lifetime Assessment concept [5] 
 
The aim of the Lifetime Assessment is to determine, as reliably as possible, the point 
when, as a result of advanced ageing, the failure probability, see figure 8, increases 
super-proportionally as compared to that for normal operation. 
 
 
Figure 8. Development of failure probability as a function of time [5] 
 
2.3.2.2. Examples of Lifetime Assessment 
 
The Lifetime Assessment paper [5] includes three examples where the Lifetime 
Assessment on air-cooled turbo-generators was performed. The three examples are 
summarised next. 
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Example 1: 
 
Turbo-generator: air cooled / 85MVA /13.8kV / 60 Hz / built 1980. 
 
An off-line inspection within the scope of the planned outage was performed and the 
results evaluated using the Lifetime Assessment method. Taking all boundary 
conditions into consideration, which needs to be entered into the Lifetime 
Assessment for evaluation, the stator in question was shown to have a high failure 
risk. It was decided to take corrective measures immediately. Figure 9, shows the 
compilation of the evaluation principle and a “failure curve” that is assigned to each 
evaluation criterion. 
 
 
Figure 9. Example of an evaluation of the insulation condition [5] 
 
After completing the corrective measures, the vibration level had decreased, which 
in-turn decreased the short-term expected failure risk [5]. 
 
Example 2: 
 
Turbo-generator: air-cooled / 40.5MVA / 13.8kV / 60Hz / Built 1976. 
 
The initial inspection of the machine did not reveal anything unusual but in fact, 
indicated that the unit was in a good and reliable condition. Even the standard visual 
inspection of the individual components did not reveal any deficiencies [5]. 
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Additional Lifetime Assessment endoscopic inspections were carried out, not 
included in the normal diagnostic program, which detected degradation of the corona 
protection system. The Lifetime overall Assessment for this machine then gave the 
failure probability as being higher than 1%, refer to figure 10 [5]. 
 
 
Figure 10. Example of evaluation of the slot corona protection [5] 
 
The user was advised to have the fault, causing the high failure probability, rectified. 
The stator was rewound immediately and operated in a reliable condition within six 
months of replacing the winding. 
 
A third example is also presented in [5]. The generator appeared to be in a healthy 
condition until the use of the Lifetime Assessment tool. The Lifetime Assessment tool 
indicated the urgent need for corrective measures because the rotor winding 
insulation was in a very poor condition. Immediate corrective measures were then 
taken by the user. 
 
The real life examples from [5] show that the execution of a Lifetime Assessment not 
only can avoid unplanned operational outages of an electrical machine, but also high 
efficiency for further operation can be ensured by specific reinvestment. The paper 
[5], states that an exact time of failure determination is not yet possible, but at least 
there is a real possibility of estimating the reliability for further operation, especially 
for older power stations [5]. 
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2.3.3. ALSTOM’s WIDIPRO® & ACTS 
 
In order to obtain a reliable assessment of the actual condition of a machine, one 
needs to conduct diagnostic investigations, trend the status of the machine as well as 
estimate the failure probability of the machine. This implies that a combination of off-
line and on-line diagnostic methods is necessary for a reliable assessment of the 
generator condition. On-line and off-line diagnostic methods, used by ALSTOM and 
the process involved are discussed in [6] and summarised below:   
 
2.3.3.1. WIDIPRO® 
 
For off-line inspections, ALSTOM uses the WIDIPRO® (Winding Diagnostic 
Inspection PROgram). These are a series of non-destructive measurements, each 
yielding partial information on the condition of the system.  
 
All collected data are stored in the WIDIPRO® database, including physical 
characteristics of the machine and unit operational data, where thousands of 
measurements over the last 30 years are available. This then allows the engineer 
today to recall similar cases from the past and to compare with. The time involved for 
this process is reduced to a fraction, by the application of a data mining algorithm, 
which avoids having to do a cost intensive manual assessment [6].  
 
2.3.3.2. ACTS 
 
As mentioned before, only the combination of off-line and on-line diagnosis and 
monitoring methods will allow the implementation of condition-based maintenance. 
The ALSTOM ACTS (Assessed Condition Trending System) includes all available 
information, which allows the engineer to assess the machine condition [6]. ACTS 
uses all visual inspection information, measurements taken at standstill of the 
machine (WIDIPRO® inspection) and on-line diagnostic from all inspected machines 
[6]. Figure 11 [6], shows the principle used. 
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Figure 11. Concept of Assessed Condition Trending System (ACTS) [6] 
 
The engineer is supported by a database containing all available information from off-
line diagnosis and on-line measurements. The algorithms allow automatic sorting of 
the data and finding similar cases for aiding the engineer.  
 
2.3.4. ALSTOM’s AMODIS®  
 
An important way to gain diagnostic information is through continuous monitoring of 
the machine during operation. For this reason ALSTOM developed AMODIS®, 
(ALSTOM Monitoring and Diagnostic System). This is a PC-based plant monitoring 
and diagnostic system. It consists of a wide range of modules that cover all major 
parts of the power station such as boiler, gas turbine, steam turbine generator and 
transformer, see figure 12 [7].   
 
Figure 12. AMODIS® Plant Monitoring System [7] 
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Each module can be installed independently or in combination with any of the other 
modules. The modules are interconnected by an Ethernet Network and send their 
data to a platform computer where a software package is installed for long-time 
trending and display purposes [7]. 
 
The following cases explain the use of AMODIS® to identify and prevent failures [7]: 
 
2.3.4.1. AMODIS®: Rotor Condition Monitoring  
 
In 2004, a turbo-generator in East Asia experienced intermittent sudden steps in the 
measured vibration values at the generator bearings. An AMODIS® system with a 
ROMON-II module was connected to observe and trend the shaft voltage. On 
analysis of the data it was seen that the 6th harmonic drops from 3V to very low 
values, 200mV and jumps back after 3 days to 3V and the cycle repeats itself. The 
OEM experts identified this to be caused by a short circuit in the rotor windings. An 
inspection of the rotor windings with a boroscope showed debris and dirt in the end 
winding. This dirt and debris was carefully cleaned away. The machine was re-
started and the high level of the 6th harmonic did not appear. 
 
2.3.4.2. AMODIS®: Stator Condition Monitoring 
 
A on-line partial discharge (PD) measurement using AMODIS® and module PAMOS 
showed unusually high PD readings, approximately 10 times higher than previous 
measurements taken by the customer [1]. According to the OEM expert analysis of 
the AMODIS® PD data, the origin of the PD was some kind of sparking in the end-
winding caused by moisture or surface contamination. Analysis of the cooling gas 
was performed and a visual inspection of the end winding during an outage was 
done. The gas analysis showed high moisture content within the cooling gas caused 
by a defective dryer. The dryer was replaced and the machine restarted. A 
subsequent on-line PD measurement showed normal behaviour.  
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2.3.5. GE’s Root-Cause Diagnostics 
 
A paper by an ex-General Electric generator specialist, now president of Maughan 
Engineering Consultants [8], discusses the importance of having state of the art 
monitoring equipment in good operating condition and list 5 examples where the root 
cause of failure was mis-diagnosed resulting in major expenditures for incorrect or 
insufficient repairs. The paper summarises the condition monitoring challenge for the 
generator owners as follows: 
1) Be certain that the generator monitoring equipment is state-of-the art and kept 
in good operating condition. 
2) Record and retain monitoring equipment information. 
3) Use ones' own good judgment to assure that the diagnostics information from 
on-site appears plausible. 
4) Bring in additional support early in the event the diagnostic information is 
suspicious. 
 
Mis-diagnosis of the root cause of generator failures can be exceptionally costly. The 
five diagnostic errors observed are listed below. The direct repair cost associated 
with these listed incidents ranged from a few hundred thousand to many millions of 
dollars [8]: 
1) Ring of fire stator winding failure on a 900MW water-cooled winding was 
incorrectly blamed to the piping arrangement. Had the correct error not been 
identified by further consultation, then a repeat of the massive stator winding 
failure would have been inevitable. 
2) Stator winding failure on a 200MW stator incorrectly attributed to “lightning”. 
Corrective action was based on the mis-diagnostics. The unit failed again 
several months later at the same location for the same cause – partial 
discharge. 
3) On a 250MW generator, contamination of a core end packing was judged to be 
from minor stator bar vibration and no corrective action was taken. The root 
problem was core looseness and the winding failed to ground a few weeks 
thereafter. 
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4) Core discolouration over-looked at location of stator winding failure. The 80MW 
stator was rewound without correcting the core-iron condition. New 
replacement winding failed in service shortly after return to service. 
5) Asphalt stator winding incorrectly diagnosed as having rapid migration of the 
ground-wall. Recommendation was to perform an immediate stator rewind on 
the 200 MW machine to avoid catastrophic service failure. In fact migration had 
long-since ceased and the stator was completely serviceable without any repair 
required. 
 
2.3.6. GE’s Generator Maintenance/Assessment Approach 
 
A paper by Maughan entitled, ‘Inspection/Test Impact on Maintenance of Generators” 
[9], re-emphasises that during the last 20 years, there has been increasing pressure 
within the power generation industry to extend operating periods between 
inspection/maintenance outages. The paper also acknowledges that an important 
approach to outage extension has been that of Predictive Maintenance.  
 
To accomplish Predictive Maintenance, beyond review of operating and maintenance 
records, Maughan states that there are three primary tools: monitoring devices, 
inspection and test. The paper [9], addresses aspects of each of these three 
assessment tools. Each of these three assessment tools has important weaknesses, 
which are explained in [10], though. 
 
If all three tools are used wisely, [10], states that it is possible to decrease but not 
eliminate exposure to forced outages. If the tools are used well, planning and 
execution of needed maintenance can be considerably improved in content and 
quality.  
 
The paper [10], addresses aspects of each of the three topics: 
 
a) The strengths and weaknesses of standard and optional monitoring equipment. 
b) Inspection equipment and procedures that will help assure an accurate visual 
assessment of the generator components. 
c) Limitations and strengths of off-line test procedures and equipment. 
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Some common generator deterioration mechanisms assessed by the three tools are 
addressed in [10].  
 
In the conclusion of his paper [10], Maughan states that accurately predicting the 
timing and scope of all needed maintenance on an operating generator is not 
possible with the present state of the art of generator monitoring, inspection and test 
tools. Maughan states that the present five year periods between inspections may 
not be appropriate but that on the other hand, an arbitrary and long period between 
inspections may result in neither reliable life nor low maintenance cost. 
 
2.4.  Comparison between condition monitoring equipment: RFM 
 
There are many generator condition monitoring devices that can be used to monitor 
various components of the generator. In the following section, a comparison of Rotor 
Flux Monitoring (RFM) equipment will be compared. 
 
A flux probe is a small coil of fine wire mounted on a rod which supports it in the 
generator air gap. There exist two basic types, a permanent and a temporary. The 
permanent probe is a flexible rod which can bend to permit the rotor to be removed 
or inserted. The temporary probe is a long rigid rod which is inserted through a seal 
during generator operation, passing through a radial ventilation duct in the stator 
lamination to the air gap. 
 
The signal from the flux probe is then channelled through a waveform analyser and a 
computer software analysis program. When completed and depending on the OEM 
monitoring equipment, the analysis will provide the following, as minimum, outputs 
[11]: 
• Integration of the probe signal to construct the air gap flux density 
waveform.   
• Voltage spike amplitude measurements. 
• Amplitude averaging. 
• Pole-to-pole coil ratios. 
• Tabular and graphical presentation of the analysis. 
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The theory and principles of rotor flux monitoring are well explained in [12, 13].  
 
The use of air gap flux probes is an effective method to detect generator rotor 
winding shorted turns as a means of preventative maintenance. This is because air 
gap flux probe data can pinpoint the number and location (pole and coil) of shorted 
turns without having to take the generator off-line [12], depending on the type of 
Rotor Flux Monitoring (RFM) equipment installed, as will be seen in the example that 
follows: 
 
Example on RFM: 
 
A 1200MW unit installed in 1980 in USA operated reliably until April 2003. In April 
2003 and again in October 2003, the unit experienced a step increase in shaft 
vibration [13]. The vibration level of the machine as compared to ISO 10816-2:1996 
indicated that the unit was operating in zone C/D, which is unacceptable for long term 
service. 
 
On both occasions, the step changes were associated with severe grid disturbances 
and large negative sequence currents from the switchyard recording data. A thermal 
sensitivity test combined with the customer’s initial flux probe test revealed four inter-
turn short circuits within the winding. The sensitivity test showed that the vibrations 
were sensitive to excitation current, hence thermally induced, thus caused by the 
inter-turn short circuits. 
 
The inter-turn faults deteriorating further resulting in either the generator having to be 
shut down or worse developing into an earth fault, was un-acceptable to the 
customer, who needed the unit to operate until March 2008, when the next major 
outage was possible. An Emergency Response Plan (ERP) [13] was developed to 
ensure that the effect of the unit being forced from service was minimised. 
 
A vital part of the ERP was the identification and location of the inter-turn faults using 
rotor flux monitoring of the air gap search coils. This identification approach is 
discussed in full detail in [13].  
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Initial readings on full load indicated the presence of 3 or 4 inter-turn faults see figure 
13.  
 
A detailed study was conducted using the OEM’s Rotor Flux Monitoring (RFM) 
equipment, which identified 8 inter-turn faults and their location: pole and coil. This 
meant that if the customer’s data had only been used, then at best the work program 
for the repair would have to have been doubled and at worst not all faults would have 
been identified and repaired.  
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Original RFM identification of 4 inter-turn faults [13] 
 
 
Figure 14. Location & Position of 8 inter-turn faults identified by OEM RFM [13] 
 
Figure 14, shows the fault position in each of the poles. In total 8 faults in 5 coils 
were identified. 
 Kamal K.D. Makan 9607058T  22 
   
 
3. Objective 
 
The objective of the project was to identify areas of greatest risks within the 600MW 
generators, to develop a sound understanding of the integrity of the equipment, to 
conduct a review of the maintenance regime and to generate short, medium and long 
term recommendations, so that the generators can continue to operate in a safe and 
reliable manner. 
 
4. Equipment covered 
 
Duvha units 1 to 6: 600MW Generator, specifically: 
1) Generator rotor, 
2) Generator stator, 
3) Excitation System: 
• Main exciter: 
• Exciter stator, 
• Rotating exciter assembly, 
• Rotating rectifier unit, 
• Permanent magnet generator, 
• Instrument brush gear. 
4) Bearings and pedestals: 
• No. 9 bearing: generator front end, 
• No. 10 bearing: generator rear end, 
• No. 11 bearing: exciter rear end, 
• No. 12 bearing: PMG front end, 
• No. 13 bearing: PMG rear end. 
5) Generator auxiliary systems i.e. seal oil system, stator water system, hydrogen 
system and barring gear.  
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5. Plant Process Parameters 
 
A snapshot of the plant process parameters for Duvha Power Station during the plant 
visit was collected using the station’s installed instrumentation. The station’s units 
screen extracts and collected plant walk-down data are enclosed in Appendix A1, 
figures 19 - 24. The process parameters enclosed by a red box in the screen dump 
extracts are viewed to be questionable by the author. This is because the parameter 
value is not what it should be, based on the load condition. Refer to the design, 
specification, alarm or recommended values as listed in the plant walk-down data for 
unit 1, in Appendix A1: Plant Walk-Down captured Table. 
 
5.1. Plant Walk-Down Analysis Unit 1 
 
At the time of the snapshot data capture, Duvha unit 1 was on load at 503MW, 
239MVAr, 14.4kA, 22.2kV, with its output data included in Appendix A1: Figure 19 
and Table of Plant Walk-Down data. The generator was running within the designed 
parameters as defined in the operation and maintenance manuals.  
 
However, the author noted discrepancies between the plant gauges and the 
operator’s mimic, for example, a comparison of plant gauge and mimic data showed 
the stator water system inlet temperature on the mimic as 23°C and on the plant it 
read 51°C. Clarification on what is taken as the reference reading or if a master 
gauge is used for commissioning was unable to be established by the author. The 
author is therefore concerned about the instrumentation accuracy. 
 
It is important to calibrate and match plant and mimic data to ensure that the plant is 
being operated by accurate data. Differences in indicated values can lead to 
operational uncertainty and the true condition of the plant not being fully understood.  
 
→ Urgent calibration and matching between the plant and mimic data is required.a 
                                                          
a
 “→” denotes corrective actions to be actioned in conjunction with Criticality Review Table. See Conclusion. 
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For the stator water system the stator inlet and outlet pressures were not set to the 
recommended design specification, the inlet and outlet pressures should be 365kPa 
and 110kPa, respectively. Refer to Appendix A1: Figure 19, Table of Plant Walk-
Down data. 
 
The stator water inlet temperature, according to the plant gauge, was at 51°C (alarm 
point is 43°C) resulting in a standing alarm, which means no protection for the plant if 
the alarm temperature increases further. The stator water flow rate was under the 
minimum recommended level of 21l/sec. The outlet temperature of 68°C was close to 
alarm value, (alarm point is 72°C) however the temperature differential of 17°C is 
acceptable. 
 
The excessively high inlet temperature is due to a deficiency within the auxiliary 
cooling water (ACW) or primary cooling water system. 
 
The excitation system and instrumentation brush gear were operating within 
permissible parameters with no standing alarms on the operator’s desk when 
reviewed during the plant visit. However, the calculated rotor winding resistance from 
the measured rotor voltage and current, yielded unrealistic values and are indicative 
of errors in the base parameter measurements. Refer to Appendix A1: Figure 19, 
Generator extract, red information box. 
 
The bearing vibrations and temperature were all within the permissible parameters 
when reviewed during the plant visit.  
 
The seal oil/gas differential pressures were not correct as the turbine end was 
120kPa and exciter end was 145kPa with the permissible minimum recommended 
pressure being 140kPa. The low differential pressure at the turbine end being the 
one of concern. Refer to Appendix A1: Figure 19: Table of Plant Walk-Down data. 
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5.2. Plant Walk-Down Analysis Unit 2 
 
At the time of the snapshot data capture, Duvha unit 2 was on load at 595MW, 
250MVAr, 16.7kA, 22.2kV, with its output parameters included in Appendix A1: 
Figure 20 and Table of Plant Walk-Down data. These values indicate that the 
generator was running within the designed parameters. There is however a concern 
again with the instrumentation accuracy. 
 
There was a discrepancy between the plant gauges and the operator’s mimic, for 
example, the neutral terminal outlet temperature. From the snapshot of process 
parameters taken, the plant mimic read 54°C, whilst on the plant the parameter read 
38°C. Again, clarification on what is taken as the reference reading or if a master 
gauge is used for commissioning was unable to be established.  
 
→ Urgent calibration of the plant and mimic data input should be conducted. 
 
The stator water system according to the plant gauges were within permissible 
parameters with the inlet pressure a little high at 370kPa and the flow under the 
design recommended flow of 21l/sec. The stator water generator inlet temperature 
was at 43°C, which is at the alarm value i.e. 43°C. Refer to Appendix A1: Figure 20 
and Table of Plant Walk-Down data. 
 
The stator winding and core temperatures according to the operator’s mimic were 
within permissible parameters. It is however a concern that 12 of the thermocouples 
are not reading meaning that there might be hot spots that can be overlooked.  
 
→ Hence it is important to restore instrumentation functionality to a sufficient level 
that will allow for monitoring functionality and for condition based assessments to 
be effective. 
 
The excitation system and instrumentation brush gear were operating within 
permissible parameters with no standing alarms on the operator’s desk when 
reviewed during the plant visit by the author. 
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The bearing vibrations and temperatures were all within the permissible parameters 
with bearing no. 9, the highest. 
 
Analysis of hydrogen cooler hot gas and cold gas temperatures, based on the 
temperature differential, indicated a cooler load imbalance with the left hand side, 
(looking from turbine end to exciter end), front/turbine end cooler indicated to be 
carrying away minimal losses.   
 
5.3. Plant Walk-Down Analysis Unit 3 
 
At the time of the snap shot data capture, Duvha unit 3 was on load at 549MW, 
5MVAr, 14.2kA and 22.3kV, with its output parameters included in Appendix A1: 
Figure 21 and Table of Plant Walk-Down data. These values indicate that the 
generator was running within the designed parameters. There is again the concern 
that the instrumentation accuracy is a problem, with many discrepancies between the 
plant gauges and the operator’s mimic.  
 
→ Urgent calibration of the plant and mimic data should be conducted. 
 
The stator water system according to the plant gauges were not within permissible 
parameters with the inlet pressure at 365kPa,  the outlet pressure at 90kPa and with 
the flow rate at 22l/sec. Refer to Appendix 1, Figure 21: Table of Plant Walk-Down 
Data. 
 
The generator stator water inlet temperature was at 46°C, which is over the alarm 
value of 43°C, resulting in a standing alarm, with no protection if the alarm 
temperature increases further, which is not considered best practice. 
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The stator winding and core temperatures according to the operator’s mimic were 
within permissible parameters; however there were a high number of stator 
temperature thermocouples that were not functioning. This is of concern to the author 
as it limits the effectiveness of condition based monitoring and also increases the 
operational risk on the unit, as no prior early warning indication of a potential fault 
occurring can be detected.  
 
The temperatures of the exciter end hydrogen seal could not be obtained, as the 
thermocouples were not functioning. This coupled to the fact that the vibration of 
bearing no. 10 was the highest in the turbine-generator train at 106µm, results in the 
author’s conclusion that the unit is in an unhealthy running condition. 
 
→ An investigation of the exciter end of the machine should be conducted to identify 
any hidden defects/root cause for the bearing 10 high relative vibration reading. 
 
The excitation system and instrumentation brush gear were operating within 
permissible parameters with no standing alarms on the operator’s desk. 
 
Hydrogen gas purity value is normally expected to be around 99%, with alarm action 
at 95%. The unit 3 hydrogen purity, according to station instrumentation, was found 
to be the lowest of the units during the visit at 96.5%. A purity decrease of 1% results 
in an increase in friction and windage losses of 10%; furthermore a purity change of 
3% can have a 15% effect on the coolant’s specific heat capacity and subsequently 
affect the ability to effectively cool the machine.  
 
→ The reason for the low hydrogen gas purity should be investigated and action 
taken to restore it to normal operating values. 
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5.4. Plant Walk-Down Analysis Unit 4 
 
At the time of the snap shot data capture, Duvha unit 4 was on load at 602MW, 
208MVAr, 16.5kA, 22.3kV with its output parameters included in Appendix A1, Figure 
22 and Table of Plant Walk-Down data. The process parameters indicate that the 
generator was running within the designed parameters. There is the concern again 
that the instrumentation accuracy is a problem. There were discrepancies between 
the plant gauges and the operator’s mimic, for example, for the stator water system. 
 
The generator stator temperature (AKZ code SP01T042) was reading 2047°C, which 
clearly indicates an instrumentation error. Any instrumentation channel defects 
results in a reduction in the plant data available to the operators and increases the 
operational risk to the unit. 
 
→ Hence all instrumentation faults should be identified and rectified. 
 
The generator inlet temperature of 41°C was close to the alarm value of 43°C, with 
the high unit load probably being the reason for this. 
 
The stator winding and core temperatures according to the operator’s mimic were 
within permissible parameters.  
 
There were no exciter voltage and current readings on this unit. On investigation it 
was found that the supply to the field cubicle was switched off. On enquiry it was 
advised that the reason that it was switched off was due to one brush wetting power 
supply being faulty. This is a very unhealthy running condition as there is no rotor 
earth fault alarm with this supply switched off.  
 
ALSTOM Operational Philosophy Statement OPS008, “Action in the Event of a Rotor 
Earth Fault”, [14], instructs that in the event of a rotor earth fault that the unit should 
be de-loaded and de-excited as soon as is practicable and the reason for the earth 
fault investigated and corrected before returning on load.  
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With no rotor earth fault alarm coverage there is an operational risk that a single point 
breakdown of the rotor winding insulation will remain undetected. In the event of a 
second earth fault, at any point in the system, the passage of the resulting large fault 
currents will cause severe and irreparable arcing damage to the rotor body, rotor end 
winding retaining rings or to the excitation system.  
 
The ALSTOM report S180/05/040/a, dated July 2005 [15] details the investigation 
into a possible inter-turn fault on unit 4 rotor S/N S2079/05. A summary extract is 
included in Appendix A2a. The report was unable to fully conclude the possibility of 
the presence of an inter-turn fault and further testing/investigation was 
recommended.  
 
The ALSTOM report S180/06/029/a, dated August 2006 [16], reported on the 
additional testing, resulting in the final conclusion that no current carrying inter-turn 
faults existed in the rotor S2079/05. A summary extract is included in Appendix A2b. 
 
The bearing vibrations and temperatures were all within the permissible parameters 
with bearing no. 10 having the highest vibration. 
 
The ALSTOM OPS006 [14], recommends that the hydrogen gas pressure dew point 
be maintained in the range of -25°C to +10°C. The plant instrumentation indicated a 
gas drier outlet dew point of 20°C. 
 
→ True moisture levels for unit 4 to be established and the hydrogen gas condition 
returned to within recommended moisture levels. 
 
The stator water system pH during the plant walk down was at 9.92, outside the 
recommended range of between 8 and 8.5.  
 
→ The true stator water chemistry conditions needs to be verified for compliance 
with the adopted chemistry regime. 
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5.5. Plant Walk-Down Analysis Unit 5 
 
At the time of the snap shot data capture, Duvha unit 5 was on load at 526MW, 228 
MVAr, 14.8kA and 22.3kV with the following parameters captured in Appendix A1, 
Figure 23 and Table of Plant Walk-Down data. The generator was running within the 
designed parameters; however the re-occurring issue of the instrumentation 
accuracy is of concern again.  
 
There was a discrepancy between the plant gauges and the operator’s mimic for the 
stator water system. The stator water system parameters according to the plant 
gauges are not within permissible values, with the inlet pressure too low at 350kPa. 
For the indicated outlet pressure of a low 95kPa, it is expected that the flow should 
be higher than the recorded 21l/sec. Due to the high stator water differential 
pressure, possible flow restrictions in the stator bars (copper hollow strands) may 
exist.  
 
→ The unit 5 process parameters should be reviewed to ascertain the true condition 
of the stator water cooling system, focusing on the stator winding cooling 
channels. 
 
The bearing vibrations and temperatures were all within the permissible parameters 
with bearing no. 10 noted as the highest during the plant visit.  
 
The plant snapshot data showed the inlet dew point at 25°C. This implies that either 
the instrumentation is faulty or that the hydrogen coolant moisture levels are 
excessively high. The condition of the hydrogen coolant is critical to the long-term 
efficiency and reliability of the unit. 
 
→ The hydrogen coolant system should be investigated to establish the actual 
condition of it and any root cause issues are to be corrected.  
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5.6. Plant Walk-Down Analysis Unit 6 
 
At the time of the snap shot data capture, Duvha unit 6 was on load at 549MW, 
13.8MVAr, 14.2kA and 22.34kV, with the process parameters captured in Appendix 
A1, Figure 24 and Table of Plant Walk-Down data. 
 
The stator winding and core temperatures according to the operator’s mimic were 
within permissible parameters, with 2 thermocouples not reading. Any 
instrumentation channel defects results in a reduction in the plant data available to 
the operators and increases the operational risk to the unit. For this reason 
instrumentation faults should be prosecuted and rectified.  
 
The plant data capture indicated a problem with the hydrogen coolant system. The 
generator hydrogen gas casing pressure was recorded at a low value of 390kPa. The 
hydrogen gas dryer has a standing alarm with an inlet dew point of -3 and outlet of 
+3°C. Whilst these levels are within the recommended range, the fact that the dryer 
outlet dew point is actually higher than the inlet is indicative of dysfunctional gas 
dryer. 
 
→ The hydrogen gas dryer functionality and instrumentation should be investigated 
to establish its true condition and any root cause issues corrected, as operating 
with standing alarms results in no protection for the plant if the alarm temperature 
increases further. 
 
The excitation system and instrumentation for the brush gear were operating within 
permissible parameters with no standing alarms on the operator’s desk.  
 
The bearing vibrations and temperatures were all within the permissible parameters 
with bearing 10 having the highest vibrations. 
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5.7. Discussion of the Plant Process Parameters from Plant Walk-down 
 
A high number of data channels connected to instrumentation were found not to be 
operational across all 6 units. These results in ineffective condition based monitoring 
and increase the operational risk due to the early detection of faults not being 
possible. 
 
Numerous discrepancies between the plant gauges and the operator’s mimic 
diagrams were found across all 6 units. It is important to have correctly calibrated 
and matching plant and mimic data in order to ensure that the station is controlled by 
valid and accurate data. 
 
All units except for unit 3 have no stator water conductivity measurement and unit 3’s 
value of 20ug/l appears to be incorrect. Recommended design value is 2µS/cm.  
 
The hydrogen cooling gas outlet dew point was found not to be consistent across all 
units. Units 1, 2, 3, and 5 all having very low dew point readings. Unit 2 and 4 
readings indicative of dysfunctional driers.    
 
All units’ except for unit 1, seal oil/gas differential pressure were not set to the design 
recommended value of 140kPa. Stator water, seal oil and hydrogen gas pressure 
interrelationship is critical to the operational and long term health of the generator. If 
the correct differential pressures are not maintained then any minor defect or leak 
increases significantly. Water into gas leaks due to incorrect pressures results in long 
term issues of insulation degradation.  
 
Information received with regards to Eskom Generation fleet Unit Capability Loss 
Factor (UCLF), show a 17.7% year to date, of which the seal oil systems and seals 
are the biggest contributor at 8.4%.  
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6. Plant Integrity Assessment 
 
The report up to now has discussed the assessed condition of the units based on the 
captured plant walk-down data. The condition of the plant will now be assessed and 
discussed using ALSTOM’s Plant Integrity Assessment tool, which is an analytical 
process used to provide an understanding of the condition of the plant. An 
explanation of the ALSTOM Plant Integrity Assessment process is included in 
Appendix A3. Words beginning with a capital letter are key words for terminology 
used in the assessment and required input parameters for the analytical tool. 
 
What follows in this report explains how the inputs into the analytical tool have been 
decided for Process Indicator, Inspection Condition and Feature inputs (refer to 
section 6.1), and how the Final Assessed Condition scores for the sub-components 
of the generator were obtained for the Plant Condition Assessment.  
 
The outputs of the tool are then compared for consistency by the author with what 
the sub-component’s condition should reflect based on the author’s past experiences 
and knowledge of Duvha Power Station. 
 
6.1. Duvha Process Parameter Assessment 
 
Due to the plant walk-down data having discrepancies between plant gauges and 
operator’s mimic, it was decided that the Process Parameter data be taken from the 
station VA system. Data from the period May 2007 to February 2008 was obtained. 
The following section explain the input methodology for unit 1 Process Parameter 
findings/scores as indicated in Appendix A4, under column “Process Indicator”, with 
the data analysis for the Process Parameters as conducted by the author for unit 1 
included as Appendix A5. The inputs into the analytical tool for Process Parameters 
for the other units have undergone this same analysis process.  
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6.1.1. Duvha Unit 1 Process Parameters 
 
Generator Load Factor 
The generator load data is included in Appendix A5, as figure 27. The author 
compared this data to the generator capability chart and found the data to be within 
the boundaries of the design parameters. The author did note load conditions above 
the maximum rated 600MW which have been entered into the analytical tool to be 
taken into account. 
 
Stator Winding Temperatures 
Analysis of the Stator Winding Temperatures, figure 28, Appendix A5, indicates that 
the temperatures are within design specifications. Highest temperature was 70.12°C, 
with highest average temperature of 55.4°C. The generator stator bars are insulated 
with class F insulation (maximum temperature 155°C). However the author has noted 
rapid load changes which do result in a degree of thermal cycling and accordingly 
entered into the tool. Long term effects of thermal cycling are detrimental to the 
insulation. 
 
Core Body & Tooth Temperatures 
The Core Body and Tooth Temperatures were noted to be high, with the highest 
temperature of 119.2°C (maximum 130°C, core plate insulation class F) and 
106.37°C, respectively. Refer to figure 29, Appendix A5. On analysis of the high 
temperatures, a correlation was noted between the low generator casing pressure 
and low hydrogen purity as the causes. 
 
Stator Water Outlet Temperatures 
The highest Stator Water Outlet Temperature was 79.16°C (above the alarm setting 
of 72°C. Refer to figure 30 in Appendix A5. The author attributes this to the high Cold 
Condenser cooling water Inlet Temperature as the higher this temperature the higher 
the stator water inlet temperature, hence the higher outlet temperature. Two 
temperature signals, 01A_SP01T088 and 01A_SP01T089 are of concern as they 
both indicated values higher than the alarm setting and were 10°C higher than the 
rest of the other Outlet Temperatures. 
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Hydrogen Gas Temperatures 
The average cooled gas temperatures have been found to be close to the average 
alarm value of 41°C, at 39.73°C. The reason for this is again due to the high Cold 
Condenser cooling water Inlet Temperature. The highest Hot Gas temperature was 
79.93°C; the alarm setting is at 75°C and trip value set at 90°C. But the reason for 
this is most likely due to the high Cooled Gas temperature.  
 
However what is concerning to the author is the variance in temperatures above 
alarm value and within 10°C of the trip value, as can be seen in figure 31 in Appendix 
A5, which are not linked to load changes. Experience has shown that such behaviour 
is related to deteriorating gas coolers.  
 
Hydrogen Cooler Performance – Delta ∆T 
An analysis of the Hydrogen Cooler performance revealed poor cooling performance, 
see figure 15.  
 
Figure 15. hydrogen Cooler ∆T Analysis 
 
The left hand (LH) Turbine End (TE) cooler average ∆T was 16.56°C and the Exciter 
End (EE) average ∆T was 13.24°C. The Right Hand (RH) Exciter End cooler average 
∆T was 22.19°C and the TE average ∆T was 12.9°C. The design ∆T value across 
the coolers should be 20 - 29°C. Only one cooler on unit 1 is performing within 
specification.  
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Hydrogen Seal Temperatures 
The highest Hydrogen Seal Temperature was 447.5°C (RH turbine end of the 
generator), refer to figure 32, Appendix A5. This is regarded as an instrument error 
by the author, because the LH turbine end of the generator thermocouple did not 
read the same temperature. The rest of the seals temperatures were noted to be 
running much colder than expected, with the alarm value set at a high value of 
130°C, which is also regarded as an instrumentation error. 
 
Generator Hydrogen Stator Water Pressure Differential 
The Gas to Water differential was found to be at the incorrect relationship, by the 
author, with the Stator Water pressure being greater than the Hydrogen gas frame 
pressure. Refer to figure 33, Appendix A5. The differential pressure should be 35kPa 
between the Hydrogen at 400kPa and Stator Water at 365kPa.  
 
The low hydrogen pressure on unit 1 will result in wetting of the insulation, if a leak 
occurs. This will result in the electrical strength of the insulation decreasing. In 
addition the leakage water can de-laminate the insulation, which leads to partial 
discharge.  
 
Bearing and Pedestals 
The analysis of the data captured indicated no significant maximum or minimum 
concerns, but an analysis of the trend within the data reveals a significant upward 
trend (36% change) for bearing 11 exciter front end. Refer to figure 34, Appendix A5. 
 
6.2. Duvha Inspection Assessment 
 
Following on from the Process Parameter assessment, all available outage reports 
and reference material was reviewed by the author, in order to have an 
understanding of and to develop the As Found and As Left condition for the Duvha 
unit components from an Inspection Assessment point of view. The following 
sections provide the details for the individual unit Inspection findings scores, as 
indicated in Appendix A4, under column “Inspection Condition”. 
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6.2.1. Duvha Unit 1 Inspection 
 
The Rotek report [18] that reported on the 1991 major outage, contains details of a 
planned slot wedge modification to address the issue of end of core wedge 
looseness. The report contains the recommendation that the stator coolant system 
must be closely monitored for temperature increases and flow rate fluctuations due to 
copper oxide deposits that were noted during the outage. This supports the observed 
high values in a number of Process Parameter temperatures and is a significant 
finding according to the author for the analytical tool. The report also noted damage 
to the unit’s hydrogen seal carrier.  
 
The Rotek report [19] noted that during the November 2001 turbine outage, during 
the planned generator inspection work scope, that both FE and RE hydrogen seals 
were scrapped. Records suggest that prior to this outage; the unit has been 
operational for 18 years from commissioning with only one generator inspection 
outage evident, which is difficult for the author to believe and may more likely be that 
some outage reports are missing. 
 
The ALSTOM outage visit report [20] gave Duvha support during the January 2002 
minor outage when a number of stator winding leaks were identified. Due to the 
method of conducting leak detection and repair activities, the report recommended 
that all winding overhang support bolts be torque tightened after 12 months of 
running, due date February 2003, due to overhang supports being disturbed. An 
inspection in December 2002 is noted but with no records of the torque tightening 
being performed. And again a major outage in 2005 indicated no records of this 
activity being done. During the Inspection analysis it has not been possible to confirm 
that this action has been completed and it thus considered as a significant finding by 
the author for input into the analytical tool. 
 
Summary findings from the captured partial discharge results [21], reported that the 
red phase displays signs of slight de-lamination at the line end. Blue and white 
phases display slot discharges and de-lamination towards the neutral end. The report 
also advises on possible loose bracing in the overhang at the turbine end and 
recommended that capacitive couplers be fitted to the generator.  
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Partial discharge couplers are installed to Duvha unit 1 with on-line monitoring, 
however no data from the system could be obtained to support the assessment. 
 
6.2.2. Duvha Unit 2 Inspection 
 
For Duvha unit 2 after the 2003 incident recovery (where the generator was 
destroyed by a hydrogen explosion), the amount of information obtained has not 
been able to fully support the Inspection analysis.  
 
However, from the information collected, the principle driver from the unit inspection 
records has been the journal bearings and associated subcomponents, due to the 
following Inspection findings by the author:  
 
In February 2004, in response to a high unit vibration signature, a bearing inspection 
was conducted which resulted in a number of findings. The interim inspection report 
[22] summary findings stated: No. 9 bearing top keep clearance excessive (0.25mm), 
No. 9 bearing half joint open 0.127mm, generator coupling periphery found low by 
0.15mm, radial rubs No. 9 bearing rear LHS and pedestal 5 rear LHS oil wipers, 
evidence of running lightly on bearing 9 and toward the top of the clearance.  
 
In March 2004, in response to a rapid increase in metal temperature of bearing 11 
(exciter rear), a forced outage shutdown and unit strip down was conducted [23]. A 
full investigation of the generator and exciter PMG was conducted to determine the 
loading present on bearing 11. Bearing 11 was found to be wiped, bearing 12 was 
low. Actions were taken to address the misalignment and the unit returned to service. 
These finding are considered significant by the author and accordingly taken into 
account for the assessment. 
 
On installation of the ex-Isle of Grain stator (S/N S3126/01/820) coolant flows in the 
mains terminal hoses were reported as high and a  modification advised by OEM, but 
the terminal manifold was returned to original condition [24]. 
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6.2.3. Duvha Unit 3 Inspection 
 
The 2002 outage, classified by Duvha as a mini GO but classified by the author as a 
major outage based on the rotor removal/exchange, did not involve the OEM. The 
following findings were found in the OEM report [25]: 
 
The stator terminal insulation was not in accordance with OEM specification, which 
results in reduced integrity. 
Stator winding pressure and vacuum tests were not conducted in accordance with 
OEM specifications. 
During the return to service a leak was discovered on the stator water manifold 
equalising pipe; alignment of main manifold after full O-ring replacement could have 
been the possible root cause.  
Several PTFE hoses were refitted with deep cuts and abrasions due to non-
availability of spare hoses and the long lead time of 14 weeks did not support the 
outage. 
 
Inner to outer frame seals were found on inspection to have deteriorated and no 
remedial actions were conducted during the 2002 outage. The report recommended 
replacing the seals at the next opportunity.  
 
These Inspection findings have all been taken into account in the Inspection 
Condition input of the assessment, refer to Appendix A4, under column Inspection 
Condition.  
 
6.2.4. Duvha Unit 4 Inspection 
 
The scope of work of the Duvha unit 4 general outage in 2003 for the main generator 
included the main rotor removal and stator inspection. The results of the inspection 
found evidence of stator fretting at the rear end in three areas: 6 o’clock outboard 
circumferential, 7 o’clock inboard circumferential and at 10 o’clock bracket [26]. This 
is mostly likely due to the stator earth fault that occurred on this unit. 
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The rotor shaft revalidation which was conducted as part of the rewind in 2003, 
showed a number of areas where the rotor forging required machining and hand 
dressing to reduce the return to service risk to a minimum. 
 
The rotor journals were found to have machined grooves and plunger groove crack 
indications which were removed by machining and hand dressing. Some rotor slot 
teeth ears were found cracked and left in that condition. 
 
The author believes that the rotor forging condition as is does not contribute to a 
significant in service risk; with the as Left findings still being taken into account into 
the assessment, refer to Appendix A4, under column Inspection Condition. 
 
6.2.5. Duvha Unit 5 Inspection 
 
During the interim outage, conducted in 2001, 5 litres of oil was found in the 
generator casing [27]. The route cause of the finding was not established; most likely 
due to poor stator frame/casing sealing.  
 
All other visual and inspection activities conducted in 2001, showed the stator core 
and winding to be in a good condition with no substantial findings, aside from the 
thermal aging process on the stator winding and insulation. 
 
Three repairs to stator winding coolant system leaks were achieved in 2004; one on 
the stator water manifold, exciter end top bar 2 and exciter end top bar 12. All leak 
sites were repaired using locktite sealer, which is a temporary repair method. 
 
The general outage inspection in 2004 also included a wedge tightness test, which 
indicated deterioration of wedge tightness. A re-wedge was not possible with the 
condition left in the As Found state.  
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6.2.6. Duvha Unit 6 Inspection 
 
The rotor exchange conducted in 2007 (S2068/02 out, S2079/06 in), which was 
driven by inter turn faults on the in-situ rotor resulted in the main stator consequential 
damage after the rotor “dropping” incident. The ALSTOM inspection report [28], 
reported cracks on the stator inboard winding support brackets and stator cooling 
water leaks were identified during the 2007 outage whilst re-commissioning the unit.  
 
6.3. Feature Risk Assessment 
 
The Feature risk table for Duvha Power Station is included as Table 1, with the key 
identified Features for the components: main rotor, main stator and exciter, analysed 
and confirmed by the author for their present, as fitted, design known modifications. 
The key features have been included in Appendix A6 with their Feature scores 
included in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Duvha Power Station Plant Feature Risk Table [17] 
 
Berth Rotor Serial No. Rotor 
Feature 
Score 
(a) 
Stator 
Serial No. 
Stator 
Feature 
Score 
(b) 
Exciter 
Serial No. 
Exciter 
Feature 
Score 
(c) 
Overall Unit 
Feature 
Score 
(a+b+c) 
Duvha 1 S2068/03 30 S2068/01 66 S2068/01 0 96 
Duvha 2 DAX3233/0003 50 S3126/01 62 S2068/02 0 112 
Duvha 3 S2125/03 69 S2068/03 54 S2068/03 6 129 
Duvha 4 S2079/05 61 S2068/04 62 S2079/04 0 123 
Duvha 5 S2068/01 95 S2068/05 62 S2079/05 0 157 
Duvha 6 S2079/06 53 S2068/06 44 S2079/06 0 97 
Spare Rotor S2068/02 56      
 
6.3.1. Duvha Unit 1 Feature 
 
For Duvha unit 1 (rotor S2068/03) the Feature score is low based on the rotor being 
a rewound unit benefiting from consolidated coils, 3-land seating arrangement and 
18Cr/18Mn coil retaining rings. 
 
The stator Feature score differentiator is driven by the back of core bar feature, i.e. 
insulated or un-insulated. Duvha unit 1 has un-insulated back of core bars. 
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6.3.2. Duvha Unit 2 Feature 
 
The rotor DAX3233/0003 low Feature score is due to the revalidation rewind 
conducted in 2003. It’s score is not as low as unit 1, due to it being an imported rotor 
with no known past operational data. 
 
The stator key differentiator Feature compared to Duvha unit 1 and 3 is its insulated 
core. The only other Feature differentiator for the stator design is the end of core 
pack ventilation arrangement that allows Duvha unit 6 to have larger margins of 
operation at leading power factors. 
 
6.3.3. Duvha Unit 3 Feature 
 
Rotor S2125/03 installed in Duvha unit 3 has the second highest Feature score of the 
Duvha installed rotors. This is due to its manufacturing period of 1981 and no 
recorded full refurbishment rewind work scope having been conducted. The rotor was 
held as a spare during 2002 with no refurbishment recorded. 
 
The key drivers of the Feature score are unconsolidated coils and associated top 
packer material, 18Mn/4Cr coil retaining rings and associated sub components such 
as end winding retaining ring liner material.  
 
Duvha unit 3 stator Features are common to unit 1 with un-insulated back of core 
bars. The other significant core Feature is the core end packet arrangement, 
common for units 1-5, different on unit 6.  
 
6.3.4. Duvha Unit 4 Feature 
 
Rotor S2079/05 has been rewound and the significant rotor Feature drivers of 
18Mn/18Cr EWRR and consolidated coils having been implemented. The relative 
high score for the rewound rotor being driven by not implementing the rotor forging 
modifications/features, 3-land seating arrangement and auxiliary rotor component 
modifications during the 2003 rewind scope of work. 
 
 Kamal K.D. Makan 9607058T  43 
   
 
6.3.5. Duvha Unit 5 Feature 
 
Rotor S2068/01 has the highest Feature score of the rotors in service at Duvha. This 
rotor has had a non OEM, rewind done in 1997. OEM records still show the principle 
drivers for the rotor Feature score as being present on the rotor. The non OEM 
rewind only removed the EWRR stress corrosion cracking risk with the fitting of 
18Mn/18Cr EWRR, according to the author. 
 
The stator Feature score is comparable with Duvha units 1-4, with the main driver 
being attributed to the unknown in service modifications.  
 
Duvha unit 5 overall Feature score is the highest when compared to the other units. 
This is a combination of rotor, stator and exciter Feature drivers. The rotor Feature 
would have been lower if OEM modifications were implemented during the non-OEM 
rewind. 
 
6.3.6. Duvha Unit 6 Feature 
 
Duvha unit 6 rotor S2079/06 is a rewound rotor with consolidated coils, 3-land 
seating, 18Mn/18Cr EWRR, which should result in a low Feature score. But a 
number of features could not be verified during the analysis, by the author, which is 
the reason behind this rotor score being higher than unit 1 and unit 2 rotors, due to 
worst case scenarios being assumed.  
 
Duvha unit 6 stator Features represent the latest core design from all Duvha stators. 
The core end packet arrangement with better ventilation, (common for units 1-5, 
different on unit 6), results in larger margins for normal operation and for operation at 
leading power factors compared to the other Duvha stators. The overall result is the 
lowest stator Feature score of the Duvha units. 
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6.4. Plant Condition Assessment Scoring  
 
The plant condition assessment scoring is summing up of the Process Parameter, 
Inspection and Feature scores, from Appendix A4, with the aid of weighting 
coefficients to develop the Assessed Condition Score. At the simplest level it is a 0, 
1, 2, 3, input, but this is modified depending on the parameter being assessed by a 
set of rules that have been developed and fine-tuned over a number of years, which 
defines the method of interpretation of the input data by the analytical tool. 
 
The findings from the analysis as conducted by the author, for Process Indicator 
(section 6.1), Inspection Condition (section 6.2) and Features (section 6.3) are used 
as the basis for input into the analytical tool. The key then is to use the tool to focus 
the analysis of the findings and the drivers/reasons behind the results, to obtain a 
ranked order for corrective actions, based on the Condition Assessed Score. 
 
It is important to note that the final scores are not as significant as their order relative 
to each other for the different units; provided that the input data has been entered in 
a consistent manner relative to the findings for the sub-components for each unit. 
 
The scoring output, at this stage, is not a direct link to operational risk as impact 
(Consequence of Failure, CoF), is not yet considered. This is done during the 
Criticality Review, section 7. 
 
However this still allows comparisons between units to be made to target highest 
priority corrective actions based on Assessed Condition Scores and later with the 
inclusion of Consequence of Failure, Criticality Scores. 
 
The analytical tool is then used to display the results graphically which allows the 
worst unit to be identified easily. 
 
The plant condition assessment scoring summary is presented as figures 16 and 17, 
with the Assessed Condition Score details for individual units, included in Appendix 
A4. 
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Figure 16. Duvha Power Station Units 1-3 Plant Condition Assessment Scoring [17] 
 
 
Figure 17. Duvha Power Station Units 4-6 Plant Condition Assessment Scoring [17] 
 
Figures 16 and 17 illustrate the subcomponent scores having been grouped into the 
key component areas of main rotor, main stator and bearing & exciter, with the 
summation of the unit overall score for each unit. A discussion of figure 16 and 17 is 
presented below for the individual units: 
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6.4.1. Duvha Unit 1 Assessed Condition Status 
 
From figure 16, it can be seen that the highest component score is the main stator, 
with its contributing scores indicating no significant difference between the Process 
and Inspection findings with the driver being the main stator’s Feature findings. 
 
The highest component process parameter score is Bearings/Exciter, which is driven 
by the findings of the vibration trend on bearing 11, main exciter. 
 
Looking at the overall component scores, the Process Indicator score is the highest 
and thus identified as the key driver. The process score is being driven by the current 
operational practices, poor unit cooling and the discrepancies found during the 
analysis of the process parameter data. 
 
6.4.2. Duvha Unit 2 Assessed Condition Status 
 
Duvha unit 2, main stator has the highest component score, figure 16, which is due to 
the condition and operational issues, following the rebuild in 2003 and cooling issues 
with the hydrogen cooler differential temperatures. 
 
The main contributor to the Bearings/Exciter score is due to the issues with bearings 
and shaft alignment, from the Inspection Condition Findings.  
 
6.4.3. Duvha Unit 3 Assessed Condition Status 
 
There is no significant difference between the unit 3 component scores for the main 
rotor and main stator. For the main rotor score it is important to note that no 
Inspection data was collated to support the analysis. Unit 3 Bearing/Exciter Feature 
score is driven by the presence of 18Mn/4Cr exciter coil retaining rings and the 
operational risk of stress corrosion cracking. 
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6.4.4. Duvha Unit 4 Assessed Condition Status 
 
Duvha unit 4 overall unit score is being driven by the main rotor, refer to figure 17. 
The main rotor overall score is higher than expected for a rewound rotor. This is 
because the rotor Inspection score contributors are principally from the As Left 
condition following the 2003 rewind, where a number of rotor forging defects were left 
as found and not addressed. The corresponding Feature score also being driven by 
the present Features of the rotor remaining as original build, with the 2003 rewind 
being based on a “reuse of component” policy, therefore not upgrading/modifying the 
rotor Features to latest technology and current best engineering practice.  
 
6.4.5. Duvha Unit 5 Assessed Condition Status 
 
Looking at figure 17: unit 5, the Overall Assessed Condition score is driven by the 
main stator with its Feature score being the main contributor. This is due to the 
unknown in service modifications. The second highest contributing factor being the 
main rotor Feature which is as a result of the non-OEM rewind and all OEM 
modifications not being implemented.  
 
6.4.6. Duvha Unit 6 Assessed Condition Score 
 
The Overall Condition Accessed score for unit 6 is also driven by the main stator, 
with the main stator score been driven by its Inspection Condition findings. This is 
due to the rotor ‘dropping” incident, which reported cracks on the stator inboard 
winding support brackets and no record of repairs being done.  
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6.5. Duvha Plant Condition Assessment Scoring Discussion 
 
Comparison of the Overall Assessed Condition scores for the individual units against 
the average reveals that the Duvha units all fall within a similar scoring pattern, 
station average ±30. The notable exceptions being unit 2, with the lowest score due 
to the 2003 rebuild and unit 4, which has the highest Overall Assessed Condition 
score. 
 
The unit 4, with the highest Overall Assessed Condition score indicates that there are 
underlying issues with the unit condition, which is in-line with the author’s analysis 
findings. It will be shown, that the unit 4 criticality review results in the second highest 
criticality score which is driven by the Process Indicator findings for example 
hydrogen seal temperatures. 
 
The unit 2, main rotor with four years service represents the best practice from the 
other Duvha units with the lowest assessed score with no significant deviations 
between the contributing fields of Process Indicators, Inspection conditions and 
Feature scores. 
 
The bench mark for the bearings/exciter component group is being set by units 5 and 
6. Unit 3 bearings/exciter assessed condition score whilst low contains the Feature 
driver of 18Mn/4Cr coil retaining rings that presents an in service risk of stress 
corrosion cracking. 
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7. Duvha Criticality Review 
 
The criticality review develops the component analysis and Assessed Condition 
Scores to achieve a ranked component score that incorporates unit operational risk. 
 
Sub-components Assessed Condition Scores greater than 1, from Appendix A4, are 
pulled through to develop the Criticality Review. This is to ensure the capture of all 
sub-components falling just below the set criticality review threshold score of 1.5, 
refer to Appendix A3, after a Consequence of Failure (CoF) is carried out, as the 
criticality scores would then be elevated (above set threshold) and included in the 
criticality ranked listing. 
 
The Consequence of Failure analysis is developed from 3 aspects, abbreviated S, W 
and D: 
• S – Whether the failure would cause the unit to be Shutdown. 1 implies 
no shutdown through to 10 which implies instant unit Shutdown. 
• W – The amount of Work needed to rectify the problem. 1, no work 
required through to 10, major Work required, i.e. greater than 2 months. 
• D – Damage to other parts of the machine. 1, no Damage to other 
component through to 10, catastrophic failure to generator. 
 
The average of S, W and D results in the CoF score, with the Criticality Score = 
Assessed Condition Score x CoF. 
 
The criticality review table for Duvha units is presented in Table 2. The table displays 
the identified issues in a ranked order of criticality for all 6 units: 
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Table 2: Duvha Power Station Criticality Review Table 
Impact Assessment Unit  Station Criticality 
Ranked Order 
Sub Component Assessed 
Condition 
Scores 
Originally 
Ranked 
Order 
Key Driver Description 
S D W CoF 
Criticality 
Score 
Duvha 1  1 Bearing Liners 3.50 1 Vibration 10 5 5 6.67 23.33 
Duvha 1 2 Inlet & Outlet 
Manifold 
Temperatures 
2.52 2 Recorded temps & Cu 
deposits 
10 5 5 6.67 16.80 
Duvha 3 3 Manifold 
Temperatures 
2.50 2 Values frequently in alarm 10 5 5 6.67 16.67 
Duvha 4 4 Manifold 
Temperatures 
2.00 5 Values frequently in alarm 10 5 5 6.67 13.33 
Duvha 4 5 Bearing Liners 2.00 6 Vibration 10 5 5 6.67 13.33 
Duvha 5 6 Manifold 
Temperatures 
2.00 2 Values frequently in alarm 10 5 5 6.67 13.33 
Duvha 1 7 Manifolds 2.06 4 Hydrogen Pressure 8 6 5 6.33 13.05 
Duvha 1 8 Shaft ends general 2.15 3 Vibration 2 8 6 5.33 11.47 
Duvha 4 9 Shaft ends general 2.15 1 Minor damage unit vibration 
signature 
2 8 6 5.33 11.47 
Duvha 2 10 Exciter Bearings 2.24 1 Vibration & Temperature 4 4 5 4.33 9.71 
Duvha 3 11 FE Seal Journal 2.00 3 Lack of monitoring, spurious 
values, lack of reliable 
monitoring 
2 5 6 4.33 8.67 
Duvha 3 12 RE Seal Journal 2.00 4 Lack of monitoring, spurious 
values, lack of reliable 
monitoring 
2 5 6 4.33 8.67 
Duvha 4 13 FE Hydrogen Seal 2.00 3 Process Parameters: 
Temperatures unknown in 
service condition 
2 5 6 4.33 8.67 
Duvha 4 14 RE Hydrogen Seal 2.00 4 Process Parameters: 
Temperatures unknown in 
service condition 
2 5 6 4.33 8.67 
Duvha 3 15 LNB Coil Slot 
Portion 
1.29 8 Low stator water flow, 
Doppler results-foreign 
matter blockages 
10 9 1 6.67 8.60 
Duvha 3 16 Rotor Pole Slot 
Dampers 
2.00 5 Feature 1 8 2 3.67 7.33 
Duvha 6 17 Rotor Pole Slot 
Dampers 
2.00 2 Feature 1 8 2 3.67 7.33 
Duvha 1 18 LFB Coil Slot 
Portion 
1.29 6 High Temps 1 10 5 5.33 6.88 
Duvha 5 19 Hydrogen Coolers 2.06 1 Cold Gas temp in alarm 
instrumentation faults 
2 3 5 3.33 6.87 
Duvha 2 20 Hydrogen Coolers 2.00 2 Hot gas temperatures & 
delta T values 
2 3 5 3.33 6.67 
Duvha 6 21 Stator End Winding 
Support System 
1.33 4 Residual damage after rotor 
drop incident 
1 8 6 5.00 6.65 
Duvha 2 22 Jacking Oil Hoses 
& Pipes 
1.96 6 High operating pressure & 
inspection findings 
1 4 5 3.33 6.53 
Duvha 2 23 Manifolds 1.25 3 2003 rebuild alignment fit & 
Feature driven mod state 
5 5 5 5.00 6.25 
Duvha 6 24 Hydrogen Coolers 1.74 3 Cold gas temp in alarm 
instrumentation faults 
2 3 5 3.33 5.80 
Duvha 6 25 Manifold 
Connection Pipes 
1.25 6 In Service Leaks 7 5 1 4.33 5.42 
Duvha 5 26 Stator Coils 
(Grouped) 
1.02 3 Doppler Blue Phase PI & 
Locktite coil repair 
6 8 1 5.00 5.10 
Duvha 6 27 Manifolds 1.12 7 In Service Leaks 7 5 1 4.33 4.85 
Duvha 2 28 Main Generator 
Bearing Liner 
1.00 4 RTS Vibration Issues 4 5 5 4.67 4.67 
 
The Criticality Review findings, Table 2, for each unit, are summarised below with the 
operational risks, based on the assessment findings by the author and OEM opinion, 
also listed for each unit. 
 
7.1. Duvha Unit 1 Criticality Review 
 
• Bearing 11, exciter front end vibration trend should be confirmed and 
monitored. 
• Stator water and gas differential pressure excursions place Duvha unit 1 at risk 
of further stator water leaks. 
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• The hydrogen cooler imbalance ∆T, is considered a significant issue, which 
should be rectified at the earliest opportunity. 
• Stator water outlet temperatures should be closely monitored. 
• Winding overhang support bolt security should be confirmed by confirmation of 
re-torque activity or as planned activity for the next outage. 
 
7.2. Operational Risks Identified for Duvha Unit 1 
 
• Generator hydrogen gas, stator water differentials. 
• Bearing 11 vibrations. 
• Hydrogen cooler imbalanced ∆T. 
 
7.3. Duvha Unit 2 Criticality Review 
 
• Increased monitoring and strategic spares support should be considered for 
Duvha unit 2 exciter bearings. 
• The hydrogen cooler imbalance ∆T is considered a significant issue that should 
be rectified at the earliest opportunity. 
• The jacking oil pressure should be adjusted and pipes monitored for fractures 
at earliest opportunity, see last bullet. 
• The manifolds should be adjusted for correct fit and alignment and monitored 
for cracks propagating due to vibration, at earliest opportunity, see last bullet. 
• Duvha unit 2 minor outage inspection frequency should be in accordance with 
ALSTOM OPS 015 [14] (every 2 years until the unit vibration signature and 
bearing wear rates after the 2003 rebuild can be established, e.g. Up to 
planned general outage in 2013).  
 
7.4. Operational Risks Identified for Duvha Unit 2 
 
• Hydrogen coolers poor performance. 
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7.5. Duvha Unit 3 Criticality Review 
 
• Stator water inlet pressure should be adjusted to 365kPa and Hydrogen cooler 
instrumentation and performance should be investigated, which will have a 
positive affect on the manifold temperatures. 
• Hydrogen seal thermocouples should be investigated and restored at next 
opportunity. 
• Hydrogen seal inspection should be targeted for next planned outage. 
• Replace 18Mn/4Cr exciter rotor coil retaining rings with 18Mn/18Cr to reduce 
stress corrosion cracking risk. 
• Regular periodic stator inspection should be conducted as recommended in 
ALSTOM OPS 015 [14], with targeted inspection (TVA probe) and review of 
general findings for indications on top bar 42 defects. 
 
7.6. Operational Risks Identified for Duvha Unit 3 
 
• Generator hydrogen gas, stator water differentials. 
• Exciter end hydrogen seal poor condition and unknown operating 
temperatures. 
• Turbine end hydrogen seal poor condition or instrumentation fault. 
• Stator top bar 42 poor condition. 
• Exciter rotor coil retaining ring material (18Mn/4Cr risk). 
 
7.7. Duvha Unit 4  
 
• Stator water inlet pressure should be adjusted to 365kPa and Hydrogen cooler 
instrumentation and performance should be investigated, which will have a 
positive affect on the manifold temperatures. 
• Increased monitoring and strategic spares support should be considered for 
Duvha unit 4 bearings. 
• Rotor shaft ends to be monitored for crack propagation. 
• Hydrogen seal temperature instrumentation requires investigation and 
restoration at earliest opportunity. 
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• At next outage opportunity a sample of the PTFE hoses (at least 3 hoses) 
should be removed and analysed for overheating affects.  
 
7.8. Operational Risks Identified for Duvha Unit 4 
 
• Generator hydrogen gas, stator water differentials. 
• Hydrogen seal temperatures parameters indicate either instrumentation errors 
or poor likely condition of the hydrogen seals at the exciter end. 
 
7.9. Duvha Unit 5 Criticality Review 
 
• Instrumentation issues on the manifold and hydrogen cooler temperatures to be 
investigated and rectified. 
 
7.10. Operational Risks Identified for Duvha Unit 5 
 
• No significant issues. 
 
7.11. Duvha Unit 6 Criticality Review 
 
• Routine monitoring should target bearing 10 to detect any in service 
deterioration. 
• Inspection of the stator end winding support system should be included in the 
work scope for the next inspection, whilst risk mitigation actions to be identified 
to address consequential damage, resulting from the rotor dropping incident.  
• In service leaks on the manifolds to be closely monitored until repairs can be 
executed. 
• Instrumentation issues on the hydrogen cooler temperatures to be investigated 
and rectified. 
 
7.12. Operational Risks Identified for Duvha Unit 6 
 
• No significant issues. 
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7.13. Duvha Criticality Score Comparison Discussion  
 
Figure 18, shows the highest unit criticality being unit 1 with its key drivers being the 
Process Parameters findings. The adverse vibration trend on bearing 11 is also a 
significant identified operational risk. It is expected that short to medium term actions 
addressing the key drivers will reduce the overall assessed unit 1 criticality, thus 
discarding unit 1 as the most critical unit. 
 
 
Figure 18. Duvha Power Station Unit Criticality Score Comparison [17] 
 
The second highest unit criticality is unit 4 (taken as the highest/worst unit). The 
general outage planned for 2010 will provide an opportunity to reduce the unit 
criticality. While not the highest main stator criticality assessed condition score, 
highest being unit 5, unit 4 represents the highest Overall Assessed Condition score.  
 
This score aligns with Duvha Power Station’s proposed stator exchange program 
with the unit being designated as the first to undergo an exchange, proposed for 
2012. 
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Only two of the 28 criticality ranked aspects have been regarded as not significant by 
the author and should not have appeared in the Criticality Review Table. These being 
criticality ranked aspects 16 and 17. The rest of the ranked aspects are accepted as 
justifiable and do align with the authors assessment findings. This implies that the 
analytical tool can be used to facilitate the assessment findings in order to display the 
Condition Assessed Scores graphically for easy interpretation purposes; - provided 
that the input data for the Process, Inspection and Feature findings are entered with 
consistency, based on the individual unit’s findings relative to each other. 
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8. Duvha Maintenance Review 
 
The future maintenance requirements based on the Plant Integrity Assessment data 
and analysis has been compared by the author to the supplied future outage plan for 
Duvha Power Station [29]. The key differences are presented in Table 3, with 
additional comments following thereafter: 
 
Table 3: Duvha Outage/Main Generator Maintenance Plan Comparison 
Unit/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Duvha 1 
         
Assessment Based mO Mar 08   MO Mar 11   mO Mar 14   
Duvha Plan Interim Inspection  GO  
Main Stator 
Inspection  Interim  
Main Rotor 
Inspection  
Stator Rewind?       4   
Rotor deployed 
(yrs) 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Comparison No mO planned      Rotor 
revalidation 
  
Duvha 2 
         
Assessment  
Based 
 mO Apr 09  mO Apr 11  MO Apr 13   mO Apr 16 
Duvha Plan Inspection  Interim 
Main Stator 
Classified 
as MO 
Inspection  GO  
Exciter Rotor 
Inspection  Interim  
Main Stator 
Main Rotor  
Stator Rewind?      2    
Rotor deployed 
(yrs) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Comparison  Plant 
Condition 
Report 
recommends 
2 yr mO 
No work 
planned for 
2010 
 Plant 
Condition 
recommends 
2 yr mO 
No Main Stator 
No Main Rotor 
Inspection 
planned 
  Classified as 
a MO, noting 
critical project 
path 
Duvha 3 
         
Assessment Based MO Sep 08   mO Sep 11   MO Sep 14   
Duvha Plan GO 
Main Stator 
Main Rotor 
 Inspection Interim  Inspection GO 
Main Stator 
 Inspection 
Stator Rewind?       5   
Rotor deployed 
(yrs) 
Rotor exchange 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Comparison    No Gen work 
planned 
     
Duvha 4 
         
Assessment Based  MO Oct 09   mO Oct 12   MO Oct 15  
Duvha Plan Inspection Interim 
Main Stator 
 Inspection GO 
Main Rotor 
 Inspection Interim 
Main Stator 
Exciter Rotor 
 
Stator Rewind?     1     
Rotor deployed 
(yrs) 
5 6 7 8 9     
Comparison     Minor based 
on 2009 
Major 
  Major based 
on 2009 
outage 
 
Duvha 5 
         
Assessment Based   MO Apr 10   mO Apr 13   MO Apr 16 
Duvha Plan Inspection  GO 
Main Stator 
Inspection  Interim  Inspection  GO 
Main Stator 
Main Rotor 
Exciter Rotor 
Stator Rewind?         6 
Rotor deployed 
(yrs) 
10 11 12       
Comparison Age of Rotor!  No work 
planned for 
2010 
  No work 
planned for 
2013 
   
Duvha 6 
         
Assessment Based   mO Jan 10   MO Jan 13   mO Jan 16 
Duvha Plan  Inspection Interim  Inspection GO 
Main Rotor 
Exciter Rotor 
Inspection  Interim 
Stator Rewind?      3    
Rotor deployed 
(yrs) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Comparison   No work 
planned for 
2010 
  SOW to include 
Stator 
  Rotor 
revalidation? 
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8.1. Plant integrity Assessment based Outage Plans 
 
The recommended outages are based on the last known outage, based on Plant 
Integrity Assessment analysis and a future proposed maintenance strategy of minor 
outage every 3 years and major outages every 6 years, where: 
• A minor outage (mO) is work scope involving inspection and testing of a shut 
down generator containing all inspection outage work scope plus intrusive 
inspection and testing of hydrogen seals and generator bearings. 
• A major outage (MO) is a work scope involving inspection and testing of a 
shut down generator containing all minor outage work scope plus the rotor is 
removed from the stator bore, allowing increased inspection and testing of 
the rotor and stator core. 
 
8.2. Duvha Long Term Outage Plan 
 
The future outage planning for comparison has been taken from [29], noting that a 
Duvha General Outage (GO), standard duration is 45 days and the Duvha Interim 
Outage duration is 28 days. 
 
From this and using the ALSTOM standard, best practice, planning time for a Major 
Outage of 28 days, it is assessed that a Major Outage (MO) work scope could be 
conducted in a Duvha General Outage. A Major Outage work scope planned for a 
Duvha Interim Outage is possible but would likely result in the generator work scope 
being/or close on the critical path. 
 
ALSTOM’s standard best practice planning time for a Minor Outage (mO) is 22 days, 
which could be conducted in a Duvha Interim or General Outage (GO). 
 
Duvha’s main rotor outage policy presently for a revalidation/exchange window is 
75,000 to 100,000 operating hours which is equivalent to 8.5 to 12 year intervals. 
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8.3. Duvha Stator Rewind Programme 
 
A proposed main stator rewind programme is currently under discussion, with 
Duvha’s stator rewind programme, revision 2 included into Table 3. A comparison 
between Duvha’s stator rewind unit order to the Plant Assessment reveals the 
following: 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Stator Rewind unit order 
 
Order of Stator Rewinds 
Duvha Plan Unit 4 Unit 2 Unit 6 Unit 1 Unit 3 Unit 5 
Plant Assessment Unit 4 Unit 3 Unit 1 Unit 5 Unit 6 Unit 2 
 
The only unit that aligns with the Plant Assessment findings for the stator rewind plan 
is the most critical unit 4, refer to table 4.  
 
8.4. Duvha Future Outage Plan Discussion 
 
The observations made from section 8.1 to 8.3 and included in Table 3 are discussed 
below: 
 
Duvha unit 1 planned maintenance, after 2010, is in line with the assessment based 
expectation and Duvha’s declared policy, noting that a Major Outage (MO) is due in 
2011. 
 
Duvha unit 2 assessment based and Duvha plan based outage plans are not in 
alignment with the assessment recommendation that Minor Outages (mO) are 
conducted every 2 years for the near future. The Duvha plan after the Major Outage 
planned for the Interim Outage in 2010 (not done), is not in alignment with declared 
Duvha policy, due to the Minor Outage on the main stator/rotor not being conducted 
in the 2013 General Outage. Minor Outages are key to reducing the operational risk 
of the unit, reducing the risk of further damage and maintaining the health of the 
hydrogen seals and bearings. 
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Duvha unit 3 is in alignment with both the assessment based expectation and Duvha 
policy plan, with the exception that no maintenance is planned for the intervening 
period between the General Outages. This planning implies that no maintenance will 
be conducted on the unit for six years. 
 
Duvha unit 4 follows the best maintenance cycle of the Duvha units and is an 
example of best practice as applied to a unit on base load operations. It is assumed 
by the author that the main rotor scope of work in the General Outage in 2012 
includes a rotor exchange or revalidation based on the operational hours/age of the 
rotor. 
 
Duvha unit 5 is in alignment with both the assessment based outcomes and the 
Duvha proposed outage plan. The age of the rotor from known records and in 
alignment with the recorded Feature risk profile, will have seen 12 years in operation, 
since being rewound by a non-OEM in 1997, at the General Outage in 2010. Whilst 
not noted in the Duvha plan a rotor exchange should be conducted during this 
outage. 
 
Duvha unit 6 follows the Duvha planned strategy of not planning to conduct any 
maintenance between General Outage (six years), similar to unit 3. The expected 
Major Outage scope of work for 2013 does not include for main stator inspections, as 
would be expected. The Interim Outage in 2016 represents the first opportunity for 
the main rotor revalidation/exchange window of 8.5 to 12 years for rotor 
revalidation/exchange. 
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9. Conclusion 
 
A generator condition assessment conducted by the author on the 6 units at Duvha 
Power Station, involved a high level plant walk-down to be performed in order to 
gauge the present operational conditions of the units. Thereafter the station data 
from the VA system was obtained and analysed for the assessment input streams of 
Process, Inspection and Feature findings. The findings by the author were entered 
into an analytical tool for the sub-components of rotor, stator and bearings/exciter for 
all 6 units. This was done in order to facilitate the analysis process of the findings in a 
manner that would easily allow interpretation and presentation of the results. The 
output from the tool, for the Condition Assessed Scores, when presented graphically 
was judged by the author to accurately correlate with his expectations. The Condition 
Assessed Scores were then developed further to achieve a ranked Criticality order, 
across all 6 units that could be used to target corrective actions which included 
operational and maintenance risk, i.e. Consequence of Failure (CoF). Only two of the 
criticality ranked aspects are viewed by the author as not being significant and should 
not have been included in the Criticality Ranked output table, as they pose no 
operational risk to the units. The author then conducted a Maintenance Review which 
compared the Duvha outage declared policy to the outcomes from the Plant Integrity 
Assessment. 
 
On reviewing the data collected from the station and the plant walk-down, it was 
noted that a number of concerns fall into the category of short term actions whilst 
others require a long term approach. It must be stated that a number of the issues 
found are common across all the units and are due to operational pressure at Duvha 
Power Station.  
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9.1. Immediate Recommended Actions 
 
The following are issues that the author would not have expected to have been left 
un-addressed: 
 
• Duvha unit 3 is operating with low hydrogen gas purity and should be restored 
to recommended operating parameters. 
 
Analysis of the hydrogen cooler hot gas and cold gas temperatures, based on 
temperature differential, indicates a cooler load imbalance on unit 2 with the left hand 
side front end cooler indicated to be carrying away minimal losses. 
 
• Unit 2 hydrogen cooler load imbalance should be investigated. 
 
9.2. Short Term Recommended Actions 
 
The discrepancies of the process parameters between plant gauges and the 
operators mimic were common across all units and must be corrected, as adequate 
and consistent plant data is required in order to fully understand the plant condition 
and to provide the operators with consistent and accurate process parameters on 
which to base their actions on. 
 
A number of systems were not set up or running to optimum conditions or 
maintaining the plant within the operational design specifications, for example: stator 
water cooling temperatures, seal oil/gas differential pressure. A short term remedy to 
the issue of the process parameters being close to alarm or marginally out of 
permissible settings can be implemented whilst the unit is on load with low risk of trip 
and limited interference to the balance of the systems. 
 
• Corrective action to restore the plant to within the defined design operating 
specifications is considered best practice and any under lying or hidden 
defect/s preventing this should be found and rectified. 
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• Regular plant checks and monitoring should be conducted to identify short term 
discrepancies and corrective actions performed. 
• A commissioning and/or re-base to the optimum settings for temperature 
control valves etc. should be conducted. 
• Operating with standing alarms is not considered operational best practice. 
Hence standing alarms and instrumentation defects should be ranked for 
importance and rectified. 
 
9.3. Long Term Recommended Actions 
 
From the reviewed data, all the units’ stator water inlet temps are high, affecting the 
efficiency of the cooling water. On investigating, it was found that the problem is due 
to the cooling water heat exchanger efficiency. Considering the generally high 
outputs being generated by the units, any reduction in efficiency of the cooling 
systems needs to be considered a serious deficiency. Increased component 
temperature levels results in an acceleration of long term degradation mechanisms. 
Note: for the stator and rotor insulation systems, a 10° Celsius increase in 
temperature results in halving the insulation life. 
 
• Considering the operational outputs, cooling systems should be optimised and 
any long term performance deterioration mechanisms rectified.   
• A review of the performance and efficiency of the ACW system and in particular 
the hydrogen coolers should be undertaken.  
• A review of the hydrogen coolers set up and performance should be conducted. 
 
In conclusion, the action bullets “→” from section 5: the Plant Process Parameters 
Assessment and the bulleted points from section 7, Plant Integrity Assessment 
Criticality Review should be actioned in conjunction with the Criticality Review Table 
2 to prioritise the actions. 
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Appendices 
 
A1. Running data snapshot & plant data captured during walk-down 
Duvha Unit 1 Running data snapshot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Duvha Unit 1 Running Data Snapshot 
Data results in a rotor 
field resistance of 
0.2359Ω 
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Duvha Unit 1 running data snapshot (cont): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plant Data Captured during 
Walk-Down 
  
Parameter Unit 1 Design/Spec/ 
Alarm/ 
Recommended 
Hydrogen System     
Hydrogen Range 
Pressure 
555 kPa 600 kPa 
Oil/Gas Diff Pressure 
TE 
120 kPa 140 kPa 
Gen Casing Pressure 400 kPa min 400 max 
450kPa 
Oil/Gas Diff Pressure 
EE 
145 kPa 140 kPa 
Gas/Stator Water Diff 
Pressure 
35 kPa Design 35kPa 
Hydrogen Purity % 98.3 95 
Electro Gas Drier     
Inlet Dew Point (Gen 
Dew Point) 
-32 -25°C to +10°C 
Outlet Dew Point -56 -25°C to +10°C 
Alarm No   
Stator Water System     
Gen Inlet Pressure 370 kPa 365 kPa 
Gen Outlet Pressure 130 kPa 110 kPa 
Pump Suction 
Pressure 
195 kPa   
Pump Delivery 
Pressure 
595 kPa   
Gen Stator Water 
Flow l/sec 
20.2 
l/sec 
21 l/sec 
Stator Water pH 9.95 8 - 8.5 
Conductivity 1.718 2µS 
Oxygen Content 35.2ppb   
Stator Water Inlet 
Temp 
51°C Design spec: 
>20°C/<43°C 
Stator Water Outlet 
Temp 
68°C   
Stator Water Terminal 
Outlet Temp 
68°C Design spec: 
<72°C 
H2 seal temps   50°C - 60°C 
Stator bar insulation, 
class F limit 
  155°C 
Bearing temps 
expected 
  65°C - 85°C  
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Data results in a 
rotor field resistance 
of 0.158Ω 
 
Duvha Unit 2 running data snapshot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Duvha Unit 2 Running Data Snapshot 
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Duvha Unit 2 running data snapshot (cont) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plant Data Captured during Walk-Down 
Parameter Unit 2 
Hydrogen System   
Hydrogen Range Pressure 540 kPa 
Oil/Gas Diff Pressure TE 160 kPa 
Gen Casing Pressure 410 kPa 
Oil/Gas Diff Pressure EE 145 kPa 
Gas/Stator Water Diff Pressure OC 
Hydrogen Purity % 98.3 
    
Electro Gas Drier   
Inlet Dew Point (Gen Dew Point) Error 
Outlet Dew Point -63 
Alarm   
    
Stator Water System   
Gen Inlet Pressure 370 kPa 
Gen Outlet Pressure 110 kPa 
Pump Suction Pressure 200 kPa 
Pump Delivery Pressure 585 kPa 
Gen Stator Water Flow l/sec 20 l/sec 
Stator Water pH OC 
Conductivity 1.35 
Oxygen Content 27.9 ppb 
Stator Water Inlet Temp 43°C 
Stator Water Outlet Temp 64°C 
Stator Water Terminal Outlet Temp 38°C 
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Duvha Unit 3 running data snapshot 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Duvha Unit 3 Running Data Snapshot 
17°C   Cooler 
??°C   Temp 
19°C   Differential 
19°C 
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Duvha Unit 3 running data snapshot (cont) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plant Data Captured during Walk-Down 
Parameter Unit 3 
Hydrogen System   
Hydrogen Range Pressure 540 kPa 
Oil/Gas Diff Pressure TE 160 kPa 
Gen Casing Pressure 420 kPa 
Oil/Gas Diff Pressure EE 158 kPa 
Gas/Stator Water Diff Pressure 35 kPa 
Hydrogen Purity % 96.5 
    
Electro Gas Drier   
Inlet Dew Point (Gen Dew Point) -42 
Outlet Dew Point -86 
Alarm   
    
Stator Water System   
Gen Inlet Pressure 365 kPa 
Gen Outlet Pressure 90 kPa 
Pump Suction Pressure 200 kPa 
Pump Delivery Pressure 600 kPa 
Gen Stator Water Flow  22 l/sec 
Stator Water pH 6.31 
Conductivity 1.66 
Oxygen Content 92ppb 
Stator Water Inlet Temp 46°C 
Stator Water Outlet Temp 60°C 
Stator Water Terminal Outlet Temp 60°C 
 Kamal K.D. Makan 9607058T  72 
   
 
Duvha Unit 4 running data snapshot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Duvha Unit 4 Running Data Snapshot 
 
 
19°C Cooler 
23°C Temp 
17°C Differential 
18°C 
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Duvha Unit 4 running data snapshot (cont) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plant Data Captured during Walk-Down 
Parameter Unit 4 
Hydrogen System   
Hydrogen Range Pressure 530 kPa 
Oil/Gas Diff Pressure TE 165 kPa 
Gen Casing Pressure 400 kPa 
Oil/Gas Diff Pressure EE 178 kPa 
Gas/Stator Water Diff Pressure 40 kPa 
Hydrogen Purity % 99.4 
    
Electro Gas Drier   
Inlet Dew Point (Gen Dew Point) -11 
Outlet Dew Point 20 
Alarm   
    
Stator Water System   
Gen Inlet Pressure 350 kPa 
Gen Outlet Pressure 140 kPa 
Pump Suction Pressure 195 kPa 
Pump Delivery Pressure 597 kPa 
Gen Stator Water Flow  20.2 l/sec 
Stator Water pH 9.92 
Conductivity 1.012 
Oxygen Content 84.5ppb 
Stator Water Inlet Temp 41°C 
Stator Water Outlet Temp 55°C 
Stator Water Terminal Outlet Temp 55°C 
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22°C Cooler 
24°C Temp 
24°C Differential 
18°C 
 
Duvha Unit 5 running data snapshot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Duvha Unit 5 Running Data Snapshot 
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Duvha Unit 5 running data snapshot (cont) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plant Data Captured during Walk-Down 
Parameter Unit 5 
Hydrogen System   
Hydrogen Range Pressure 520 kPa 
Oil/Gas Diff Pressure TE 165 kPa 
Gen Casing Pressure 400 kPa 
Oil/Gas Diff Pressure EE 150 kPa 
Gas/Stator Water Diff Pressure 35 kPa 
Hydrogen Purity %   
    
Electro Gas Drier   
Inlet Dew Point (Gen Dew Point) 25 
Outlet Dew Point -55 
Alarm   
    
Stator Water System   
Gen Inlet Pressure 350 kPa 
Gen Outlet Pressure 95 kPa 
Pump Suction Pressure 200 kPa 
Pump Delivery Pressure 605 kPa 
Gen Stator Water Flow 21 l/sec 
Stator Water pH 9.47 
Conductivity 1.08 
Oxygen Content 4.7ppb 
Stator Water Inlet Temp 38°C 
Stator Water Outlet Temp 63°C 
Stator Water Terminal Outlet Temp 55°C 
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Data results in a rotor field 
resistance of 0.144Ω 
14°C Cooler 
12°C Temp 
14°C Differential 
18°C 
 
Duvha Unit 6 running data snapshot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Duvha Unit 6 Running Data Snapshot 
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Duvha Unit 6 running data (cont) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plant Data Captured during Walk-Down 
Parameter Unit 6 
Hydrogen System   
Hydrogen Range Pressure 550 kPa 
Oil/Gas Diff Pressure TE 155 kPa 
Gen Casing Pressure 390 kPa 
Oil/Gas Diff Pressure EE 182 kPa 
Gas/Stator Water Diff Pressure 25 kPa 
Hydrogen Purity % 98.3 
    
Electro Gas Drier   
Inlet Dew Point (Gen Dew Point) -3 
Outlet Dew Point 3 
Alarm Standing 
    
Stator Water System   
Gen Inlet Pressure 365 kPa 
Gen Outlet Pressure 110 kPa 
Pump Suction Pressure 200 kPa 
Pump Delivery Pressure 595 kPa 
Gen Stator Water Flow l/sec 20.5 l/sec 
Stator Water pH 8.6 
Conductivity 0.782 
Oxygen Content 19.9ppb 
Stator Water Inlet Temp 40°C 
Stator Water Outlet Temp 68°C 
Stator Water Terminal Outlet Temp 50°C 
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A2. Summary Extract from Reports S180/05/040/a & S180/06/029/a: 
 
(a) ALSTOM Power Service Generator On/Off Line Assessment Report 
S180/05/040/a Summary Extract – On line Duvha Unit 4 Rotor S2079/05 
 
“An on-line rotor slot flux measurement was conducted on Duvha unit 4 generator in 
accordance with ALSTOM Power Service procedures. The results of the analysis 
indicate that the coil 1 (lagging) had an apparent fault indication of 1 shorted turn 
(14% of coil). After further analysis of the measurement data and other associated 
information detailed in this report this is probably due to the presence of an 
aluminium plug in a balance weight hole on the pole face rather than the actual inter-
turn fault presented as our preliminary findings. This interpretation is detailed in 
pages 4 and 5. For a reactive load swing the apparent indication on coil 1 (leading) of 
0.05 to 0.4 of a shorted turn (0.5 to 6% of coil) for the radial measurement and 0.05 
to 0.95 of shorted turn (0.5 to 14% of coil) for the tangential measurement. This 
exhibits an unusual characteristic, which may be a combination of the aluminium plug 
in a balance weight hole on the pole and a possible inter-turn fault on the opposite 
pole. Further investigation is necessary to fully establish the presence of an inter-turn 
fault as detailed in the recommended section.” 
 
(b) ALSTOM Power Service Generator On-Line Assessment Report 
S180/06/029/a Summary Extract – On line Duvha Unit 4 Rotor S2079/05 
 
“The maximum apparent fault indication recorded from the slot type probe on coil 1 is 
0.77 shorted turns on the leading edge of pole A. The fault indication level varies in 
load to a minimum of 0.05 shorted turns (noise levels) and varies in a manor that is 
not consistent with a current carrying fault. 
 
The maximum apparent fault indication recorded from the rod type probe on coil 1 is 
2.0 shorted turns on the leading edge of pole A. This level does not vary with load. 
This is again not consistent with the behaviour expected from a real fault. 
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The slot 1 fault indication from the slot type probe can be related to rotor heating and 
hence the position of the probe with respect to the balance weights in the slot 1 
regions. This indicates that this behaviour is caused by the magnetic effect of the 
balance weights adjacent to slot 1. The shape of the waveform in this region is also 
indicative of a magnetic anomaly. 
 
Other effects is expected if a real fault were present such as increased vibration and 
indications on the latest RSO tests have not been observed. 
 
It is concluded from the data gathered that the rotor is free from current carrying 
shorts.” 
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A3. Plant Assessment Process Overview Extract 
 
Plant Integrity Assessment 
 
The ALSTOM Asset Management Process [30] (Figure 25) aims to develop a 
systematic and coordinated approach to activities and practices, through which an 
organisation can optimally manage its assets and their associated performance, risks 
and expenditures over the life cycle, for the purposes of achieving its organisational 
strategy plan. 
 
The Plant Integrity Assessment Process forms the key element to Stage 1 Asset 
Condition Assessment of the Asset Management Process. 
 
The Plant Integrity Assessment (Figure 26) is an analytical process used to provide a 
full understanding of the condition of the plant. The approach is built on failure mode 
analysis at sub component level identifying failure modes and associated operational 
driver supported by the following key input streams. 
 
The Monitored Condition as determined by Process Indicators such as on-line 
condition monitoring data. The Inspection Condition as determined by reviewing the 
results of off-line inspections and tests.  
 
The Feature score captures Operational Experience, include expert opinion and 
capture experience from across similar unit designs, based on the key groups of 
Family – Any problems seen on sister plant, Expert Knowledge – Any known or 
foreseeable problems based on design knowledge and as advised by experts and 
Stable – Any problems seen on plant that utilises the same technology/component 
design. 
 
These input streams values are combined to develop an assessment of the sub 
component condition that is then summed to express an overall Assessed Condition 
of the sub component. The individually Assessed Condition component scores are 
then utilised to develop an understanding the overall unit and hence plant condition. 
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Criticality Review   
 
The Criticality Review develops the sub component analysis and Assessed Condition 
Score to achieve a ranked sub component score which can be utilised to support and 
inform station personnel in their assessment of the unit operational and maintenance 
risk. 
 
A minimum sub component threshold level score of 1.5 is set for the criticality 
process; this reduces the sensitivity to single data point entries and ensures that the 
criticality review is based on scores developed from the interaction of multiple entries 
and across scoring sections. The criticality list is drawn up from sub component 
assessed condition scores of greater than 1 to ensure capture of any sub component 
falling just below the set threshold level of 1.5 which would post Consequence of 
Failure (CoF) analysis be elevated in the criticality ranked listing. 
 
During the Criticality Review the sub component scores are amended for the 
Consequence of Failure analysis based on defect driver and significance.  
 
The Consequence of Failure is developed from three key aspects coded S, W and D: 
 
S- Whether the failure would cause machine shutdown, i.e. a breakdown requiring 
immediate attention. 1 no shutdown required, 10 instant machine shutdown. 
 
W- The amount of work required to rectify the problem, i.e. including cost and down-
time. 1 no work required, 10 major replacement > 2 months. 
 
D- Damage to other parts of the machine. 1 no damage to other components, 10 
catastrophic failure/major damage to turbine generator/plant. 
 
The three key aspects are given equal weighting with the resulting CoF calculated as 
the average of the S, W and D scores. 
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The original ranked sub component score is combined with the associated CoF to 
produce a ranked criticality where: 
• Criticality Score = Assessed Condition Score x CoF 
The Criticality Review then steps through a structured review of mitigation options 
and their applicability. 
With the ranked criticality list being supported at sub component level the key drivers 
to the overall unit Assessed Condition Score are clearly identified and the resolution 
enables targeted actions to be identified. 
The results of the criticality review are presented in the Criticality Review Table with 
supporting criticality discussion of significant finding arising during the analysis 
process. 
This understanding of plant condition is then combined with other plant 
considerations such as the effects of future maintenance plans and spares holding to 
develop a criticality assessment within the Plant Assessment Report. 
 
 
 
Figure 25. ALSTOM Asset Management Process [30] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26. ALSTOM Plant Assessment Process [30] 
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A4. Sub Component Analysis and Assessed Condition Score  
 
Duvha Unit 1: 
Sub Component Failure Mode Due To Process Indicator 
Inspection 
Condition Features 
The Final 
Assessed 
Condition 
Status 
Score 
ROTORS:       
Rotor body ends (Endring seating/Comp 
fixing holes, etc.): 
      
   Comb Fixing Holes Cracking    1.00 1.00 
Rotor Shaft Ends:       
   Shaft ends general Cracking  2.00 0.78  2.15 
   Splines     1.00 1.00 
Rotor: Coils insulation packing  wedges:       
   Pole slot wedges Cracking Fatigue  0.75  0.75 
   Rotor coils Crack at braze Bad brazing   0.50 0.50 
   Pole slot dampers & associated  
   packing & fixing 
Overheating Unbalanced 
faults 
 0.75  0.75 
   Field leads & connections Cracking Thermal & 
centrifugal 
expansion forces 
 0.75 0.50 0.90 
   Radial stalks Cracking Fatigue  0.79  0.79 
       
STATORS:       
Stator Annular Core Stator Frame Core:       
   Stator frame/casing H2 leakage Incorrect frame 
sealing 
1.50   1.50 
   Core plate & insulation Melting 
(circulating 
current) 
Loss of cooling 0.20 0.58  0.62 
   Core finger plates,  clamp plates &  
   endplates 
Melting 
(circulating 
current) 
Over fluxing   1.00 1.00 
   Core support system Weld failure Fatigue   1.00 1.00 
Stator Windings: Coils, insulation, wndgs :       
   LNB coil- slot portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(blockages) 
  1.00 1.00 
   LFB coil- slot portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(blockages) 
 0.89 1.00 1.29 
   LNB coil- overhang portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(Blockages) 
  1.00 1.00 
   LFB coil- Overhang portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(Blockages) 
 0.61 1.00 1.17 
Stator WNDGS- CONNS & TERMLS  incl 
TERML boxes: 
      
   Coil to phase ring connections Cracking Stress (thermal 
expansion) 
 0.78  0.78 
   Phase ring & extensions Cracking Stress (thermal 
expansion) 
  0.50 0.50 
   Flexible connections to terminals Cracking Vibration  0.78  0.78 
Stator WNDGS-Water cooling manifold & 
hoses: 
      
   PTFE hoses    0.33  0.33 
   Manifolds Cracking High vibration  0.50 2.00 2.06 
Stator INSTMTN/core coil cooling & heater:       
   Core & endplate thermocouples Open/short 
circuit 
Mechanical 
overload 
0.33 0.56  0.65 
   Inlet & outlet Manifold temperatures   2.50 0.33  2.52 
   Gas temperature monitoring Overheating Loss of coolant 1.00   1.00 
VNTLTN & CLRS-STR ENCL-
E/SHLD.F/SHLD & AIR BFLS: 
      
   Hydrogen coolers Tube erosion Poor water 
quality 
0.10   0.10 
Pedestals & Bearings:       
   Bearing liners   3.50   3.50 
Bearing Brackets & Bearings:       
   Bearing Liners   3.50   3.50 
   Oil Wipers    0.33  0.33 
Gland Seals. Oil Baffles etc:       
   Seal Carrier Loss of 
insulation 
Contamination 0.25 0.50  0.56 
Seal Oil System:       
   Instrumentation   1.00   1.00 
Exciters:       
   Exciter cubicle polarity bar    0.67  0.67 
       
   15.88 10.60 11.50 34.69 
 
 Kamal K.D. Makan 9607058T  84 
   
 
Duvha Unit 2: 
Sub Component Failure Mode Due To Process Indicator 
Inspection 
Condition Features 
The Final 
Assessed 
Condition 
Status Score 
ROTORS:       
ROTOR: BODY, SHAFT, CPLING, COMP       
   Shaft ends general Cracking  1.00   1.00 
   Bearing Journal Cracking   0.75  0.75 
   Face Collar    0.78  0.78 
   Splines     1.00 1.00 
ROTOR: COILS, INSUL, PKNG & WDGES       
   Rotor coils Crack at braze Bad brazing  0.78  0.78 
   Pole slot dampers & associated  
   packing & fixing 
Overheating Unbalanced 
faults 
  1.00 1.00 
   Endwinding Retaining Rings Cracking Stress 
corrosion 
 0.56  0.56 
   Field leads & connections Cracking Thermal & 
centrifugal  
  0.50 0.50 
       
STATORS:       
STATOR ANNULAR CORE: STATOR 
FRAME & CORE 
      
   Stator frame/casing H2 leakage Incorrect frame 
sealing 
1.50 0.78  1.69 
   Core plate & insulation Melting 
(circulating 
current) 
Loss of cooling   0.50 0.50 
STATOR WINDINGS: COIL & INSUL + 
WNDGS 
      
   LNB coil- slot portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(blockages) 
  1.00 1.00 
   LFB coil- slot portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(blockages) 
  1.00 1.00 
   LNB coil- overhang portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(Blockages) 
  1.00 1.00 
   LFB coil- Overhang portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(Blockages) 
  1.00 1.00 
STATOR WNDGS: SUPPORT PACKINGS & 
WEDGES 
      
   Endwinding support structure Looseness Decohesion   1.00 1.00 
STATOR WNDS, CONNS & TERMLS  incl 
TERML boxes: 
      
   Coil to phase ring connections Cracking Stress (thermal 
expansion) 
 0.11  0.11 
   Phase ring & extensions Cracking Stress (thermal 
expansion) 
  1.00 1.00 
   Terminals & flanges Flashover Oil ingress  0.04  0.04 
Stator WNDS-Water cooling manifold & 
hoses: 
      
   Manifolds Cracking High vibration  0.75 1.00 1.25 
   Manifold connection pipes (bellows, etc.) Cracking High vibration  0.75  0.75 
STATOR INSTMTN(CORE, COIL, COOLING 
& HEATER) 
      
   Gas temperature monitoring Overheating Loss of coolant 1.00   1.00 
VNTLTN & CLRS-STR ENCL-
E/SHLD.F/SHLD & AIR BFLS: 
      
   Hydrogen coolers Tube erosion Poor water 
quality 
2.00   2.00 
       
PEDESTALS & BEARINGS:       
   Bearing liners   1.00   1.00 
   Pads & insulation    0.67  0.67 
   Jacking oil hoses/pipes Fracture Hot oil  1.67 1.00 1.94 
BEARING BRACKETS & BEARINGS:       
   Bearing Liners   1.00   1.00 
   Oil Wipers    0.33  0.33 
GLAND SEALS. OIL BAFFELS ETC.:       
Aux       
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF MACHINES 
& WORKS TEST: 
      
   Alignment    0.67  0.67 
Exciters:       
   Exciter bearing    1.00  1.00 
       
   9.50 9.63 11.00 26.31 
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Duvha Unit 3: 
Sub Component Failure Mode Due To Process Indicator 
Inspection 
Condition Features 
The Final 
Assessed 
Condition 
Status 
Score 
ROTORS:       
ROTOR: BODY, SHAFT, CPLING, COMP       
   Endring Sealings Cracking High 
compressive 
stress 
  1.00 1.00 
   Comb fixing holes Cracking    1.00 1.00 
Rotor Shaft Ends       
   Shaft ends general Cracking  1.00   1.00 
   F.E. Seal Journal Cracking  2.00   2.00 
   R.E. Seal Journal Cracking  2.00   2.00 
ROTOR: COILS, INSUL, PKNG & WDGES       
   Rotor coils Crack at braze Bad brazing   1.00 1.00 
   Pole to Pole connections Crack at braze Bad brazing   1.00 1.00 
   Main Slot Cells & Slot Bridge Pieces Earth Fault Coil movement 
(thermal) 
  1.00 1.00 
   Pole slot dampers & associated  
   packing & fixing 
Overheating Unbalanced 
faults 
  2.00 2.00 
   Endwinding Retaining Rings Cracking Stress 
corrosion 
  1.00 1.00 
   Endwinding Retaining Ring Insulation Inter-turn/coil 
short 
Overheating   1.00 1.00 
   Field leads & connections Cracking Thermal & 
centrifugal  
  0.50 0.50 
       
STATORS:       
STATOR ANNULAR CORE: STATOR 
FRAME & CORE 
      
   Stator frame/casing H2 leakage Incorrect frame 
sealing 
1.00   1.00 
STATOR WINDINGS: COIL & INSUL + 
WNDGS 
      
   LNB coil- slot portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(blockages) 
 0.81 1.00 1.29 
   LFB coil- slot portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(blockages) 
  1.00 1.00 
   LNB coil- overhang portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(Blockages) 
  1.00 1.00 
   LFB coil- Overhang portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(Blockages) 
 0.81 1.00 1.28 
STATOR WNDGS: SUPPORT PACKINGS & 
WEDGES 
      
   Endwinding support structure Looseness Decohesion  0.67  0.67 
   Endwinding support bolting & lashing  Looseness Decohesion  0.67  0.67 
STATOR WNDS, CONNS & TERMLS  incl 
TERML boxes: 
      
   Phase ring & extensions Cracking Stress (thermal 
expansion) 
 0.78 0.50 0.92 
   Terminals & flanges Flashover Oil ingress  0.79  0.79 
   Terminal boxes & mounting plates Cracking Fatigue  0.75  0.75 
Stator WNDS-Water cooling manifold & 
hoses: 
      
   PTFE Hoses    2.00  2.00 
    Manifolds Cracking High vibration  0.75  0.75 
   Manifold Vent Pipes  High vibration  0.67  0.67 
STATOR INSTMTN(CORE, COIL, COOLING 
& HEATER) 
      
   Inlet & Outlet Manifold temperatures   2.50   2.50 
VNTLTN & CLRS-STR ENCL-
E/SHLD.F/SHLD & AIR BFLS: 
      
   Hydrogen coolers Tube erosion Poor water 
quality 
1.67   1.67 
   Internal Seals (e.g. Inner to outer frame 
seal) 
Broken sealing 
gaskets 
Embrittlement  1.00  1.00 
       
PEDESTALS & BEARINGS:       
   Bearing liners   1.00   1.00 
BEARING BRACKETS & BEARINGS:       
   Bearing Liners   1.00   1.00 
GLAND SEALS. OIL BAFFELS ETC.:       
   Seal Ring Wear Oil Starvation  0.67  0.67 
Exciters:       
   Exciter bearing     1.00 1.00 
       
   7.50 9.64 11.00 26.72 
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Duvha Unit 4: 
Sub Component Failure Mode Due To Process Indicator 
Inspection 
Condition Features 
The Final 
Assessed 
Condition 
Status 
Score 
ROTORS:       
Rotor Body       
   Base of slot/subslot Cracking   0.50  0.50 
Rotor Body Ends (Endring Seating/comb 
Fixing Holes etc.) 
      
   Endring Sealings Cracking High 
compressive 
stress 
 0.75 1.00 1.25 
   Comb fixing holes Cracking    1.00 1.00 
Rotor Shaft Ends       
   Shaft ends general Cracking  2.00 0.78  2.15 
   Bearing Journal Cracking   0.50  0.50 
   F.E. Seal Journal Cracking  2.00   2.00 
   R.E. Seal Journal Cracking  2.00   2.00 
   Spines     1.00 1.00 
Front End Coupling and fixing details       
   Shrunk on Coupling Slip of Coupling High Torque 
event 
 0.78  0.78 
ROTOR: COILS, INSUL, PKNG & WDGES       
   Rotor coils Crack at braze Bad brazing  0.67  0.67 
   Inter-turn insulation Short circuit Pollution  0.78  0.78 
   Coil to coil connections Crack at braze Bad brazing  0.78 1.00 1.27 
   Top of slot packing inclu. Inverted 
troughs 
Earth fault Copper dusting  0.78  0.78 
   Pole slot dampers & associated  
   packing & fixing 
Overheating Unbalanced 
faults 
 0.75 2.00 2.14 
   Field leads & connections Cracking Thermal & 
centrifugal  
 0.67 1.00 1.20 
       
STATORS:       
STATOR ANNULAR CORE: STATOR 
FRAME & CORE 
      
   Core Finger plates. Clamp plates and  
   Endplates 
Melting 
(circulating 
current) 
Over fluxing   1.00 1.00 
STATOR WINDINGS: COIL & INSUL + 
WNDGS 
      
   LNB coil- slot portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(blockages) 
 0.60 1.00 1.16 
   LFB coil- slot portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(blockages) 
 0.62 1.00 1.18 
   LNB coil- overhang portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(Blockages) 
 0.61 1.00 1.17 
   LFB coil- Overhang portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(Blockages) 
 0.61 1.00 1.17 
STATOR WNDGS: SUPPORT PACKINGS & 
WEDGES 
      
   Endwinding support structure Looseness Decohesion  0.75  0.75 
STATOR WNDS, CONNS & TERMLS  incl 
TERML boxes: 
      
   Phase ring & extensions Cracking Stress (thermal 
expansion) 
 0.78 1.00 1.27 
   Flexible connections to terminals Cracking Vibration  0.78  0.78 
STATOR INSTMTN(CORE, COIL, COOLING 
& HEATER) 
      
   Inlet & Outlet Manifold temperatures   2.00   2.00 
VNTLTN & CLRS-STR ENCL-
E/SHLD.F/SHLD & AIR BFLS: 
      
   Hydrogen coolers Tube erosion Poor water 
quality 
1.67   1.67 
       
PEDESTALS & BEARINGS:       
   Bearing liners   2.00   2.00 
   Jacking Oil Hoses/pipes Fracture Hot Oil   1.00 1.00 
BEARING BRACKETS & BEARINGS:       
   Bearing Liners   2.00   2.00 
COOLING AND LUBRICATION: GAS 
SYSTEM 
      
   Gas drier & Changeover valves Resin collapse Wetting 1.00   1.00 
   Dew point monitoring equipment Loss of 
calibration 
Contamination 1.00   1.00 
C & I Sequence & Protection       
   Stator Earth Fault (51N)    0.33  0.33 
       
   15.67 12.82 14.00 37.50 
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Duvha Unit 5: 
Sub Component Failure Mode Due To Process Indicator 
Inspection 
Condition Features 
The Final 
Assessed 
Condition 
Status Score 
ROTORS:       
Rotor Body Ends (Endring Seating/comb 
Fixing Holes etc.) 
      
   Endring Sealings Cracking High comp 
stress 
  1.00 1.00 
Rotor Shaft Ends       
   Shaft ends general Cracking  1.00   1.00 
   Spines     1.00 1.00 
   Rear end coupling and fixing details    0.78  0.78 
ROTOR: COILS, INSUL, PKNG & WDGES       
   Rotor coils Crack at braze Bad brazing   1.00 1.00 
   Inter-turn insulation Short circuit Pollution   1.00 1.00 
   Coil to coil connections Crack at braze Bad brazing   1.00 1.00 
   Top of slot packing inclu. Inverted 
troughs 
Earth fault Copper dusting   1.00 1.00 
   Field leads & connections Cracking Thermal & 
centrifugal  
  0.50 0.50 
STATORS:       
STATOR ANNULAR CORE: STATOR 
FRAME & CORE 
      
   Stator Frame/Casing H2 leakage Incorrect frame 
sealing 
 0.78  0.78 
   Core plate & insulation Melting 
(circulating 
current) 
Loss of cooling   0.50 0.50 
   Core vent plates & spacers Detachment Vibration   1.00 1.00 
   Core Finger plates. Clamp plates and  
   Endplates 
Melting 
(circulating 
current) 
Over fluxing   0.67 0.67 
   Screening Shield Overheating of 
plate 
(circulating 
currents) 
Leading power 
factor 
  1.00 1.00 
STATOR WINDINGS: COIL & INSUL + 
WNDGS 
      
   LNB coil- slot portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(blockages) 
 0.21 1.00 1.02 
   LFB coil- slot portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(blockages) 
 0.19 1.00 1.02 
   LNB coil- overhang portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(Blockages) 
 0.28 1.00 1.04 
   LFB coil- Overhang portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(Blockages) 
 0.22 1.00 1.02 
STATOR WNDGS: SUPPORT PACKINGS & 
WEDGES 
      
   Wedges Wedge wear Fretting  0.50  0.50 
   Endwinding Support Structure Looseness Decohesion  0.75  0.75 
STATOR WNDS, CONNS & TERMLS  incl 
TERML boxes: 
      
   Phase ring & extensions Cracking Stress (thermal 
expansion) 
  1.00 1.00 
   Terminals & flanges E/F (flashover) Oil ingress  0.79  0.79 
   Terminal boxes & mounting plates Cracking Vibration  0.75  0.75 
STATOR WINDINGS- WATER COOLING: 
MANIFOLD & HOSES 
      
   Manifolds Cracking High vibration  0.75  0.75 
   Manifold connection pipes (Bellows, etc.) Cracking High vibration   1.00 1.00 
   Manifold clamping  High vibration  0.67  0.67 
STATOR INSTMTN(CORE, COIL, COOLING 
& HEATER) 
      
   Inlet & Outlet Manifold temperatures   2.00   2.00 
VNTLTN & CLRS-STR ENCL-
E/SHLD.F/SHLD & AIR BFLS: 
      
   Hydrogen coolers Tube erosion Poor water 
quality 
2.00  0.50 2.06 
PEDESTALS & BEARINGS:       
   Bearing liners   1.00   1.00 
   Jacking Oil Hoses/pipes Fracture Hot Oil   1.00 1.00 
BEARING BRACKETS & BEARINGS:       
   Bearing Liners   1.00   1.00 
   Bearing support ring    0.33  0.33 
   Oil wipers    0.67  0.67 
Exciters       
   Exciter bearings    0.67  0.67 
       
   7.00 8.34 17.17 31.27 
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Duvha Unit 6: 
Sub Component Failure Mode Due To Process Indicator 
Inspection 
Condition Features 
The Final 
Assessed 
Condition 
Status Score 
ROTORS:       
Rotor Body Ends (Endring Seating/comb 
Fixing Holes etc.) 
      
   Comb fixing holes Cracking    1.00 1.00 
   Finger blocks  Cracking    1.00 1.00 
Rotor Shaft Ends       
   Shaft ends general Cracking  1.00   1.00 
   Bearing journal Cracking  1.00   1.00 
   Spines     1.00 1.00 
ROTOR: COILS, INSUL, PKNG & WDGES       
   Inter-turn insulation Short circuit Pollution 0.33   0.33 
   Main slot cells & slot bridge pieces Earth fault Coil movement 
(thermal) 
1.00   1.00 
   Pole slot dampers & associated 
packings &  
   fixings 
Overheating Unbalanced 
faults 
  2.00 2.00 
   Endwinding retaining ring insulation Inter-turn/coil 
short 
Overheating  0.33   0.33 
STATORS:       
STATOR ANNULAR CORE: STATOR 
FRAME & CORE 
      
   Stator Frame/Casing H2 leakage Incorrect frame 
sealing 
 0.78  0.78 
   Screening Shield Overheating of 
plate 
(circulating 
currents) 
Leading power 
factor 
  1.00 1.00 
STATOR WINDINGS: COIL & INSUL + 
WNDGS 
      
   LNB coil- slot portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(blockages) 
 0.31 1.00 1.05 
   LFB coil- slot portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(blockages) 
 0.31 1.00 1.05 
   LNB coil- overhang portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(Blockages) 
 0.36 1.00 1.06 
   LFB coil- Overhang portion Earth fault Therm.aging 
(Blockages) 
 0.36 1.00 1.06 
STATOR WNDGS: SUPPORT PACKINGS & 
WEDGES 
      
   Wedges Wedge wear Fretting  0.50  0.50 
   Endwinding support system (complete)  Structural 
resonance 
 1.33  1.33 
   Endwinding Support Structure Looseness Decohesion  0.67  0.67 
STATOR WNDS, CONNS & TERMLS  incl 
TERML boxes: 
      
   Phase ring & extensions Cracking Stress (thermal 
expansion) 
 0.76 1.00 1.27 
   Terminals & flanges E/F (flashover) Oil ingress  0.79  0.79 
   Terminal boxes & mounting plates Cracking Vibration  0.50  0.50 
STATOR WINDINGS- WATER COOLING: 
MANIFOLD & HOSES 
      
   PTFE Hoses    0.78  0.78 
   Manifolds Cracking High vibration 1.00 0.50  1.12 
   Manifold connection pipes (Bellows, etc.) Cracking High vibration  0.75 1.00 1.25 
   Manifold vent pipes  High vibration  0.67  0.67 
STATOR INSTMTN(CORE, COIL, COOLING 
& HEATER) 
      
   Inlet & Outlet Manifold temperatures   1.00   1.00 
VNTLTN & CLRS-STR ENCL-
E/SHLD.F/SHLD & AIR BFLS: 
      
   Hydrogen coolers Tube erosion Poor water 
quality 
1.57  0.50 1.74 
PEDESTALS & BEARINGS:       
   Bearing liners   1.00   1.00 
   Jacking Oil Hoses/pipes Fracture Hot Oil   1.00 1.00 
BEARING BRACKETS & BEARINGS:       
   Bearing Liners   1.00   1.00 
       
   9.33 9.38 13.50 29.28 
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Duvha Unit 1 Core Body Temperatures
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Duvha Unit 1 Core Tooth Temperatures
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A5. Duvha Unit 1 Process Parameters Data 
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Figure 27. Generator Load Factor 
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Figure 28. Stator Winding Temperatures 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Core Body & Tooth Temperatures 
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Stator Water Outlet SP01T088-95 Temps
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Figure 30. Stator Water Outlet Temperatures 
 
Duvha Unit 1 Hydrogen Cooler Hot and Cold Gas Temperatures
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Figure 31. Hydrogen Gas Temperatures 
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Figure 32. Hydrogen Seal Temperatures 
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Duvha Unit 1 Hydrogen Casing vs Stator Water Pressure
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Figure 33. Hydrogen Casing versus Stator Water Pressure 
 
Bearings 9,10 and 11 Vibration Chart
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Figure 34. Bearing Vibration 9, 10 and 11 
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A6. Duvha Unit Design Feature and Assessment 
 
Duvha Unit 1 Main Rotor Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Feature 
No Known Risk Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  Failure Mode 
Potential Effect(s) on 
Failure Cause of Failure S D 
Repair/ 
Mitigation W CoF 
Rotor Body 
Length 
Long (270’’) Short 
(260’’)      n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Forging 
Properties 
PS30/076>1982 PS30/076 1972-
1982 
PS30/076 
<1972    n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Winding Consolidated Coils 
Unconsolidated 
Coils   
Barring 
Hours  Electrical short 
Coil-coil-earth 
electrical breakdowns Fretting 3 8  1 4 
Rotor Shaft 
Diameter/fan 
splines  
Large 24’’ fan 
spline mod 8 fan 
splines 
Small 21’’ fan 
spline mod  
6 fan spline 
    Cracking 
Increased 
vibration/catastrophic 
failure 
High cycle fatigue 2 8  5 5 
Endwinding 
Retaining Ring 
Liner Material 
 
Nomex Asbestos 
or Kevlar Coated 
Epoxy Glass 
Asbestos (ii) 
Faced Epoxy 
Glass 
 Glass (i)   Electrical short Coil-coil-earth electrical breakdowns 
Tracking of Cu 
debris created by 
abrasion of top 
turns by glass 
fibres 
8 8 Use Nomex asbestos glass liner 8 8 
Top Cross Over  
Bottom Cross 
Over  
Turn to Turn 
Step Ups 
 
3b Oxygen Free 
Cu (i) Low Oxygen Content Cu 1a, 2b    
Hydrogen 
embrittlement 
Hydrogen 
embrittlement Oxcygen in Cu 7 7 
Replace with 
oxygen free copper 7 7 
Slot Cell 
Restraint 
Packing  
block mods and 
bonded slot cell 
Finger Block 
Insert with 
reinforcing 
dowels (iii) 
Finger 
Block 
Insert (ii) 
No Special 
Restraint (i)   
Migration of 
slot cells Earth fault 
Insufficient 
bonding and/or 
support, thermal 
expansion 
7 7 
Bonding of slot 
cells and/or packing 
block mods 
5 6 
Endwinding 
Retaining Ring 
Material 
 
18/18 (ii) 18/4 (i)   Moisture  Cracks Explosion of retaining 
ring 
Stress Corossion 
Cracking 8 7 
Replacement of 
18/18 rings 4 6 
Field Lead 
 
T Head ERM3A 
T Head CuCrMg 
Alloy 
T Head H,H Cu 
with lip 
L Head H,H Cu 
(i) with lip 
T Head 
H,H Cu 
L Head 
H,H Cu (i) 
Symmetrical 
radial 
connector  
  
Distortion and 
bending of field 
lead 
Distortion leading to 
cracking 
Prevailing 
bending moment 5 6 
Replace with T 
Head design 
(ERM3A) 
5 5 
Field Lead 
Riser Insulation 
 
Restraint lip 
machined into the 
riser 
 
No 
Restraint 
lip on 
Riser (i) 
 Load  
Degradation of 
insulation on 
riser as well as 
migration of 
insulation 
Loss of insulation No restraint lip 2 2 Machine restraint lip on riser 2 2 
Inter-turn 
Insulation  
 
Epoxy Glass Rub, Asbestos (ii) Nomex (i)  Time  
Degradation of 
insulation 
Paralysis and failure 
of insulation leading to 
shorted turns 
Cu particles 
puncturing 
insulation 
3 7 Replace with epoxy glass insulation 4 5 
Pole-pole 
flexible connect 
Restraint 
 
“Omega” Type 
Connection 
“L” Shaped with 
packing block 
Original 
“L” 
Shaped 
Support (i) 
 
Starts, 
Hours  
Distortion and 
subsequent 
cracking 
Worst case rotor Earth 
Fault 
“L” shape design 
unsuitable 5 6 
Replace with 
“omega” pole to 
pole connector 
3 5 
Endring Seating 
Arrangement 
 
Type 3 3 Land Type 2 2 Land (i) 
Type 1 
Screwed 
Ring 
 Starts  Cracks Cracking of dovetail load bearing flanks LCF 3 3 
3 land seating 
arrangement 6 4 
Packing Blocks Spigot mounted Finger Blocks      n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Restraint 
Design 
 
Axial Restraint 
No Axial 
Restraint     
Migration of 
packings Overheating 
Restricted cooling 
gas channells 3 5 
Use of lambchop 
packings 3 4 
Top Packer 
Finish 
 
PTFE coated 
Nomex 
PTFE Coated 
Glass (ii) 
Nomex 
Glass 
Ground 
Glass (i) Load  
Turn to turn 
fretting Inter-turn short 
Ground glass 
high friction 
interface 
4 3 
Use of PTFE 
coated nomex top 
packer 
3 3 
Finger 
Blocks/Support 
Comb 
 
 
Finger blocks  
Winding 
Comb (i)    Cracks 
Cracking of winding 
comb & shearing of 
fixed bolts 
Inability to 
withstand 
imposed hoop 
stresses 
2 2 Introduce finger blocks 3 2 
Finger block 
fixing 
New finger block 
design no fixing 
holes 
Upper and lower 
fixing holes     Cracking 
Increased 
vibration/forging 
revalidation risk 
HCF/LCF/Starts 2 8 NDT Inspection  5 5 
D Lead 
Laminated 
flexible and relief 
machined Glass 
Tube Insulated 
Solid D lead, no 
machined relief, 
resin insulated 
    Electrical short Worst case rotor earth fault 
Insulation 
breakdown due to 
fretting 
8 8 
Full 
revalidation/repair 
during rotor 
refurbishments 
8 8 
Damper Link 
Type 
Cad Cu Ag 
Plated 
Glass Bead 
Peened Cad Cu Cu Cr Zr   Cracking 
Reduced neg 
sequence capability Fretting 1 8 Inspection at MO 1 3 
Damper link 
configuration 2+2 damper links 
Full+2 damper 
links 
Original 
26+2 
damper 
links 
   n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil End Relief Fully relieved Coil 1-8 
Limited relief 
Coils 1-4 only No relief    Coil fretting Rotor earth fault 
Breakdown in 
insulation system 8 8 
Original build 
quality 8 8 
H2 seal Type 
 
Face Type 
Double Flow    
Running 
Hours  
Degradation of 
sealing Hydrogen leakage Wear 3 5 
Inspection repair at 
mO/MO monitor 
seal temps gas 
replenishment rate 
2 3 
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Duvha Unit 1 Main Stator Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Features 
No Known Risk Low Risk Medium Risk 
High 
Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  Failure Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
Cause of Failure S D Repair/Mitigation W CoF 
Core End Packets 
Mark 3 
 
Mark 1, Mark 2   
Leading PF 
operation 
Overfluxing 
 Thermal fatigue Core fault Reduced cooling 6 9 Temp Cond Monitoring 10 8 
Core Tooth Splits Mark A, Mark B    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Plates Material Mark α, Mark β, Mark γ    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Plate 
Insulation 
Insuline 
Totanin 
Totanin/Red Oxide 
Wanin 
   None Known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Vent Spacers/Plates Mark D Mark A, Mark B, Mark C     
Local reduced 
cooling Overheating 
Local reduced 
cooling gas flow 2 5 None 5 4 
Screening Shield 
Form U shape 
Short L 
Extended L   
Leading PF 
operation  Overheating 
End of core 
Core fault 
Increased local 
heating due to 
eddie current 
losses 
2 5 Inspection, modified 
screening shield 5 4 
Screening Shielded 
Thickness (xx) mm    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Press Phan Material 
Press phan 
material at each 
end of core  
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Bars Insulated core bars Un-insulated 
core bars   Overfluxing  
Back of core 
burning Core melting 
Recirculating 
currents 2 5 
Monitor at outages find 
core fault root cause 5 4 
Spring Mounted 
Core 
Leaf Springs 
Tangential Rods 
Longitudinal  
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Cooling 
Axial 
Radial conventional 
Radial reverse flow 
Radial multipass 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Type Half Full    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Insulation Slot System 1-6    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Insulation 
Overhang System A-F    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Cooling 
Direct water go & 
return 
Direct water single 
pass 
Direct gas single 
pass 
Indirect gas 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Wedge Type 
Plain 
Plain with tapered 
slides 
Top hay with 
tapered slides 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
PTFE Hose Joints Flourocarbon 
rubber “O” rings 
Nitrile originals, 
fluorocarbon 
spares 
  Age  Failure of seal Leaks Relaxation 6 6 Material spec change 5 6 
Water Manifold 
Position 
FE & RE 
FE 
RE 
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Water Manifold 
Fixing 
Mounted on core 
Mounted on frame    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Manifold Balance 
Pipe 
 
PTFE hose Rigid pipe   Operating hours  
Gas into water 
leak 
Relaxation/ 
Fatigue 
Running hours 
high 
Cycle fatigue 
2 6 Mod to change to flexible hose 5 4 
Manifold Type 
(Stainless/copper & 
thickness) 
Stainless 
Thick copper 
(0.125’’) 
Medium copper Thin Cu    Gas into water leaks 
Relaxation/ 
Fatigue Fatigue 6 6  5 6 
Manifold Bellows  Controlled fitment 
Uncontrolled 
fitment   
Alignment 
sensitivity  
High cycle 
fatigue Gas into water Mis-alignment 6 6 Replace/realign 3 5 
Manifold Flanged 
Joints 
Fluorocarbon 
rubber “O” rings 
Nitrile originals, 
Fluorocarbon 
spares 
  Age  Failure of seal Leaks Relaxation 6 6 Material spec change 5 6 
Stator Coils Stainless steel 
 
Copper 
  
Chemical 
control  
Blockage of 
coolant 
channels with 
Cu oxide 
Overheating 
Cu oxide build up 
poor water 
chemistry 
6 9 Core bar change Chemical clean 7 8 
Hydrogen Cooler 
tube Supports Closed cell rubber 
 
Open cell 
rubber 
  Age  Breakdown of 
rubber inserts 
Tube vibrations 
Stator 
contamination 
Fatigue 1 1 
No repair possible. 
Clean up debris when 
possible 
3 2 
Winding Support 
Brackets Epoxy glass Permali   
Operating 
hours  Relaxation Wear/fretting Relaxation 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
years 8 9 
Phase Ring Position FE RE    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Type 
Multiconductor 
hollow 
Multiconductor 
solid 
Tube 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Cooling Direct water Indirect gas    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Ends & 
Droppers 
 Original design   Operating hours  
Gas into water 
leaks 
Relaxation/ 
fatigue 
High Cycle 
Fatigue 6 5 
MO inspections, tap 
testing 6 6 
Phase Conn 
Type/Supports Revised type 
Original/ Type 
(2)   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Inner Stator Jacking 
Studs 
Key plate 
reprofiled, jacking 
plate, full 
penetration weld. 
Original profile and 
original weld detail 
     
Looseness of 
inner stator 
jacking studs 
Fatigue/ fretting Relaxation 2 8 
MO checks on radial 
jacking load and NDT of 
keyplate/ jacking plate 
welds 
4 5 
Slot Wedges Original design/ Enhanced      Relaxation Wear/ fretting 
Material creep. 
Core vibration 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
yrs 8 9 
Endwinding Support 
Blades Blocked & 
Banded 
Blades Rings & 
Studs 
Full Core 
   
Operating 
hours  Relaxation Wear/ fretting 
Material creep.  
Core Vibration 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
yrs 8 9 
Endwinding 
Structure 
Wall papered 
Original design      Relaxation Fatigue/ fretting 
Operating Hrs 
High 
Cycle fatigue 
2 6 MO inspections 5 4 
Hydrogen Seal Type Face type Double flow    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
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Duvha Unit 1 Exciter Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Feature 
No known 
Risk Low Risk 
Medium 
Risk 
High 
Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  
Failure 
Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
Cause of Failure S 
Excitation 
Method 
Brushless Slip rings   Operating hours  
Slip ring 
wear 
Increased brush 
wear 
Operating 
hours/friction 2 
Rectification 
Type 
Rotating Mk 1 
Rotating Mk 2 
Static 
         
PMG Type Salient Pole Heteropolar     Relaxation Pole block looseness 
High Cycle 
Fatigue 2 
Main Exciter 
EWRR 
18 Mn 18 Cr 18 Mn 4 Cr   Moisture  Cracks Explosion of 
retaining ring 
Stress corrosion 
cracking 8 
Pedestals GEC Mitchell          
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Duvha Unit 2 Main Rotor Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Feature 
No Known Risk Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  Failure Mode 
Potential Effect(s) on 
Failure Cause of Failure S D 
Repair/ 
Mitigation W CoF 
Rotor Body 
Length 
Long (270’’) Short 
(260’’)      n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Forging 
Properties 
PS30/076>1982 PS30/076 1972-
1982 
PS30/076 
<1972    n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Winding Consolidated Coils 
Unconsolidated 
Coils   
Barring 
Hours  Electrical short 
Coil-coil-earth 
electrical breakdowns Fretting 3 8  1 4 
Rotor Shaft 
Diameter/fan 
splines  
Large 24’’ fan 
spline mod 8 fan 
splines 
Small 21’’ fan 
spline mod  
6 fan spline 
    Cracking 
Increased 
vibration/catastrophic 
failure 
High cycle fatigue 2 8  5 5 
Endwinding 
Retaining Ring 
Liner Material 
 
Nomex Asbestos 
or Kevlar Coated 
Epoxy Glass 
Asbestos (ii) 
Faced Epoxy 
Glass 
 Glass (i)   Electrical short Coil-coil-earth 
electrical breakdowns 
Tracking of Cu 
debris created by 
abrasion of top 
turns by glass 
fibres 
8 8 Use Nomex 
asbestos glass liner 8 8 
Top Cross Over  
Bottom Cross 
Over  
Turn to Turn 
Step Ups 
 
3b Oxygen Free 
Cu (i) Low Oxygen Content Cu 1a, 2b    
Hydrogen 
embrittlement 
Hydrogen 
embrittlement Oxcygen in Cu 7 7 
Replace with 
oxygen free copper 7 7 
Slot Cell 
Restraint 
Packing  
block mods and 
bonded slot cell 
Finger Block 
Insert with 
reinforcing 
dowels (iii) 
Finger 
Block 
Insert (ii) 
No Special 
Restraint (i)   
Migration of 
slot cells Earth fault 
Insufficient 
bonding and/or 
support, thermal 
expansion 
7 7 
Bonding of slot 
cells and/or packing 
block mods 
5 6 
Endwinding 
Retaining Ring 
Material 
 
18/18 (ii) 18/4 (i)   Moisture  Cracks Explosion of retaining 
ring 
Stress Corossion 
Cracking 8 7 
Replacement of 
18/18 rings 4 6 
Field Lead 
 
T Head ERM3A 
T Head CuCrMg 
Alloy 
T Head H,H Cu 
with lip 
L Head H,H Cu 
(i) with lip 
T Head 
H,H Cu 
L Head 
H,H Cu (i) 
Symmetrical 
radial 
connector  
  
Distortion and 
bending of field 
lead 
Distortion leading to 
cracking 
Prevailing 
bending moment 5 6 
Replace with T 
Head design 
(ERM3A) 
5 5 
Field Lead 
Riser Insulation 
 
Restraint lip 
machined into the 
riser 
 
No 
Restraint 
lip on 
Riser (i) 
 Load  
Degradation of 
insulation on 
riser as well as 
migration of 
insulation 
Loss of insulation No restraint lip 2 2 Machine restraint lip on riser 2 2 
Inter-turn 
Insulation  
 
Epoxy Glass Rub, Asbestos (ii) Nomex (i)  Time  
Degradation of 
insulation 
Paralysis and failure 
of insulation leading to 
shorted turns 
Cu particles 
puncturing 
insulation 
3 7 Replace with epoxy glass insulation 4 5 
Pole-pole 
flexible connect 
Restraint 
 
“Omega” Type 
Connection 
“L” Shaped with 
packing block 
Original 
“L” 
Shaped 
Support (i) 
 
Starts, 
Hours  
Distortion and 
subsequent 
cracking 
Worst case rotor Earth 
Fault 
“L” shape design 
unsuitable 5 6 
Replace with 
“omega” pole to 
pole connector 
3 5 
Endring Seating 
Arrangement 
 
Type 3 3 Land Type 2 2 Land (i) 
Type 1 
Screwed 
Ring 
 Starts  Cracks Cracking of dovetail load bearing flanks LCF 3 3 
3 land seating 
arrangement 6 4 
Packing Blocks Spigot mounted Finger Blocks      n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Restraint 
Design 
 
Axial Restraint 
No Axial 
Restraint     
Migration of 
packings Overheating 
Restricted cooling 
gas channels 3 5 
Use of lambchop 
packings 3 4 
Top Packer 
Finish 
 
PTFE coated 
Nomex 
PTFE Coated 
Glass (ii) 
Nomex 
Glass 
Ground 
Glass (i) Load  
Turn to turn 
fretting Inter-turn short 
Ground glass 
high friction 
interface 
4 3 
Use of PTFE 
coated nomex top 
packer 
3 3 
Finger 
Blocks/Support 
Comb 
 
 
Finger blocks  
Winding 
Comb (i)    Cracks 
Cracking of winding 
comb & shearing of 
fixed bolts 
Inability to 
withstand 
imposed hoop 
stresses 
2 2 Introduce finger blocks 3 2 
Finger block 
fixing 
New finger block 
design no fixing 
holes 
Upper and lower 
fixing holes     Cracking 
Increased 
vibration/forging 
revalidation risk 
HCF/LCF/Starts 2 8 NDT Inspection  5 5 
D Lead 
Laminated 
flexible and relief 
machined Glass 
Tube Insulated 
Solid D lead, no 
machined relief, 
resin insulated 
    Electrical short Worst case rotor earth fault 
Insulation 
breakdown due to 
fretting 
8 8 
Full 
revalidation/repair 
during rotor 
refurbishments 
8 8 
Damper Link 
Type 
Cad Cu Ag 
Plated 
Glass Bead 
Peened Cad Cu Cu Cr Zr   Cracking 
Reduced neg 
sequence capability Fretting 1 8 Inspection at MO 1 3 
Damper link 
configuration 2+2 damper links 
Full+2 damper 
links 
Original 
26+2 
damper 
links 
   n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil End Relief Fully relieved Coil 1-8 
Limited relief 
Coils 1-4 only No relief    Coil fretting Rotor earth fault 
Breakdown in 
insulation system 8 8 
Original build 
quality 8 8 
H2 seal Type 
 
Face Type 
Double Flow    
Running 
Hours  
Degradation of 
sealing Hydrogen leakage Wear 3 5 
Inspection repair at 
mO/MO monitor 
seal temps gas 
replenishment rate 
2 3 
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Duvha Unit 2 Main Stator Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Features 
No Known Risk Low Risk Medium Risk 
High 
Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  Failure Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
Cause of Failure S D Repair/Mitigation W CoF 
Core End Packets 
Mark 3 
 
Mark 1, Mark 2   
Leading PF 
operation 
Overfluxing 
 Thermal fatigue Core fault Reduced cooling 6 9 Temp Cond Monitoring 10 8 
Core Tooth Splits Mark A, Mark B    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Plates Material Mark α, Mark β, Mark γ    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Plate 
Insulation 
Insuline 
Totanin 
Totanin/Red Oxide 
Wanin 
   None Known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Vent Spacers/Plates Mark D Mark A, Mark B, Mark C     
Local reduced 
cooling Overheating 
Local reduced 
cooling gas flow 2 5 None 5 4 
Screening Shield 
Form U shape 
Short L 
Extended L   
Leading PF 
operation  Overheating 
End of core 
Core fault 
Increased local 
heating due to 
eddie current 
losses 
2 5 Inspection, modified 
screening shield 5 4 
Screening Shielded 
Thickness (xx) mm    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Press Phan Material 
Press phan 
material at each 
end of core  
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Bars Insulated core bars Un-insulated 
core bars   Overfluxing  
Back of core 
burning Core melting 
Recirculating 
currents 2 5 
Monitor at outages find 
core fault root cause 5 4 
Spring Mounted 
Core 
Leaf Springs 
Tangential Rods 
Longitudinal  
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Cooling 
Axial 
Radial conventional 
Radial reverse flow 
Radial multipass 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Type Half Full    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Insulation Slot System 1-6    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Insulation 
Overhang System A-F    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Cooling 
Direct water go & 
return 
Direct water single 
pass 
Direct gas single 
pass 
Indirect gas 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Wedge Type 
Plain 
Plain with tapered 
slides 
Top hay with 
tapered slides 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
PTFE Hose Joints Flourocarbon 
rubber “O” rings 
Nitrile originals, 
fluorocarbon 
spares 
  Age  Failure of seal Leaks Relaxation 6 6 Material spec change 5 6 
Water Manifold 
Position 
FE & RE 
FE 
RE 
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Water Manifold 
Fixing 
Mounted on core 
Mounted on frame    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Manifold Balance 
Pipe 
 
PTFE hose Rigid pipe   Operating hours  
Gas into water 
leak 
Relaxation/ 
Fatigue 
Running hours 
high 
Cycle fatigue 
2 6 Mod to change to flexible hose 5 4 
Manifold Type 
(Stainless/copper & 
thickness) 
Stainless 
Thick copper 
(0.125’’) 
Medium copper Thin Cu    Gas into water leaks 
Relaxation/ 
Fatigue Fatigue 6 6  5 6 
Manifold Bellows  Controlled fitment 
Uncontrolled 
fitment   
Alignment 
sensitivity  
High cycle 
fatigue Gas into water Mis-alignment 6 6 Replace/realign 3 5 
Manifold Flanged 
Joints 
Fluorocarbon 
rubber “O” rings 
Nitrile originals, 
Fluorocarbon 
spares 
  Age  Failure of seal Leaks Relaxation 6 6 Material spec change 5 6 
Stator Coils Stainless steel 
 
Copper 
  
Chemistry 
control  
Blockage of 
coolant 
channels with 
Cu oxide 
Overheating 
Cu oxide build up 
poor water 
chemistry 
6 9 Core bar change Chemical clean 7 8 
Hydrogen Cooler 
tube Supports Closed cell rubber 
 
Open cell 
rubber 
  Age  Breakdown of 
rubber inserts 
Tube vibrations 
Stator 
contamination 
Fatigue 1 1 
No repair possible. 
Clean up debris when 
possible 
3 2 
Winding Support 
Brackets Epoxy glass Permali   
Operating 
hours  Relaxation Wear/fretting Relaxation 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
years 8 9 
Phase Ring Position FE RE    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Type 
Multiconductor 
hollow 
Multiconductor 
solid 
Tube 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Cooling Direct water Indirect gas    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Ends & 
Droppers 
 Original design   Operating hours  
Gas into water 
leaks 
Relaxation/ 
fatigue 
High Cycle 
Fatigue 6 5 
MO inspections, tap 
testing 6 6 
Phase Conn 
Type/Supports Revised type 
Original/ Type 
(2)   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Inner Stator Jacking 
Studs 
Key plate 
reprofiled, jacking 
plate, full 
penetration weld. 
Original profile and 
original weld detail 
     
Looseness of 
inner stator 
jacking studs 
Fatigue/ fretting Relaxation 2 8 
MO checks on radial 
jacking load and NDT of 
keyplate/ jacking plate 
welds 
4 5 
Slot Wedges Original design/ Enhanced      Relaxation Wear/ fretting 
Material creep. 
Core vibration 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
yrs 8 9 
Endwinding Support 
Blades Blocked & 
Banded 
Blades Rings & 
Studs 
Full Core 
   
Operating 
hours  Relaxation Wear/ fretting 
Material creep.  
Core Vibration 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
yrs 8 9 
Endwinding 
Structure 
Wall papered 
Original design      Relaxation Fatigue/ fretting 
Operating Hrs 
High 
Cycle fatigue 
2 6 MO inspections 5 4 
Hydrogen Seal Type Face type Double flow    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
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Duvha Unit 2 Exciter Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Feature No known 
Risk Low Risk 
Medium 
Risk 
High 
Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  
Failure 
Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
Cause of Failure S 
Excitation 
Method 
Brushless Slip rings   Operating hours  
Slip ring 
wear 
Increased brush 
wear 
Operating 
hours/friction 2 
Rectification 
Type 
Rotating Mk 1 
Rotating Mk 2 
Static 
         
PMG Type Salient Pole Heteropolar     Relaxation Pole block looseness 
High Cycle 
Fatigue 2 
Main Exciter 
EWRR 
18 Mn 18 Cr 18 Mn 4 Cr   Moisture  Cracks Explosion of 
retaining ring 
Stress corrosion 
cracking 8 
Pedestals GEC Mitchell          
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Duvha Unit 3 Main Rotor Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Feature 
No Known Risk Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  Failure Mode 
Potential Effect(s) on 
Failure Cause of Failure S D 
Repair/ 
Mitigation W CoF 
Rotor Body 
Length 
Long (270’’) 
Short (260’’)      n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Forging 
Properties PS30/076>1982 
PS30/076 1972-
1982 
PS30/076 
<1972    n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Winding Consolidated Coils 
Unconsolidated 
Coils   
Barring 
Hours  Electrical short 
Coil-coil-earth 
electrical breakdowns Fretting 3 8  3 5 
Rotor Shaft 
Diameter/fan 
splines  
Large 24’’ fan 
spline mod  
8 fan splines 
Small 21’’ fan 
spline mod  
6 fan spline 
    Cracking 
Increased 
vibration/catastrophic 
failure 
High cycle fatigue 2 6  5 4 
Endwinding 
Retaining Ring 
Liner Material 
 
Nomex Asbestos 
or Kevlar Coated 
Epoxy Glass 
Asbestos (ii) 
Faced Epoxy 
Glass 
 Glass (i)   Electrical short Coil-coil-earth 
electrical breakdowns 
Tracking of Cu 
debris created by 
abrasion of top 
turns by glass 
fibres 
8 8 Use Nomex 
asbestos glass liner 9 8 
Top Cross Over  
Bottom Cross 
Over  
Turn to Turn 
Step Ups 
 
3b Oxygen Free 
Cu (i) Low Oxygen Content Cu 1a, 2b    
Hydrogen 
embrittlement 
Hydrogen 
embrittlement Oxcygen in Cu 7 7 
Replace with 
oxygen free copper 7 7 
Slot Cell 
Restraint 
Packing  
block mods and 
bonded slot cell 
Finger Block 
Insert with 
reinforcing 
dowels (iii) 
Finger 
Block 
Insert (ii) 
No Special 
Restraint (i)   
Migration of 
slot cells Earth fault 
Insufficient 
bonding and/or 
support, thermal 
expansion 
7 7 
Bonding of slot 
cells and/or 
packing block mods 
7 7 
Endwinding 
Retaining Ring 
Material 
 
18/18 (ii) 18/4 (i)   Moisture  Cracks Explosion of retaining 
ring 
Stress Corossion 
Cracking 8 10 
Replacement of 
18/18 rings 6 8 
Field Lead 
 
T Head ERM3A 
T Head CuCrMg 
Alloy 
T Head H,H Cu 
with lip 
L Head H,H Cu 
(i) with lip 
T Head 
H,H Cu 
L Head 
H,H Cu (i) 
Symmetrical 
radial 
connector  
  
Distortion and 
bending of field 
lead 
Distortion leading to 
cracking 
Prevailing 
bending moment 5 6 
Replace with T 
Head design 
(ERM3A) 
5 5 
Field Lead 
Riser Insulation 
 
Restraint lip 
machined into the 
riser 
 
No 
Restraint 
lip on 
Riser (i) 
 Load  
Degradation of 
insulation on 
riser as well as 
migration of 
insulation 
Loss of insulation No restraint lip 5 5 Machine restraint lip on riser 5 5 
Inter-turn 
Insulation  
 
Epoxy Glass Rub, Asbestos (ii) Nomex (i)  Time  
Degradation of 
insulation 
Paralysis and failure 
of insulation leading to 
shorted turns 
Cu particles 
puncturing 
insulation 
3 7 Replace with epoxy glass insulation 4 5 
Pole-pole 
flexible connect 
Restraint 
 
“Omega” Type 
Connection 
“L” Shaped with 
packing block 
Original 
“L” 
Shaped 
Support (i) 
 
Starts, 
Hours  
Distortion and 
subsequent 
cracking 
Worst case rotor Earth 
Fault 
“L” shape design 
unsuitable 5 7 
Replace with 
“omega” pole to 
pole connector 
5 6 
Endring Seating 
Arrangement 
 
Type 3 3 Land Type 2 2 Land (i) 
Type 1 
Screwed 
Ring 
 Starts  Cracks Cracking of dovetail load bearing flanks LCF 3 5 
3 land seating 
arrangement 6 5 
Packing Blocks Spigot mounted Finger Blocks      n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Restraint 
Design 
 
Axial Restraint 
No Axial 
Restraint     
Migration of 
packings Overheating 
Restricted cooling 
gas channels 3 5 
Use of lambchop 
packings 3 4 
Top Packer 
Finish 
 
PTFE coated 
Nomex 
PTFE Coated 
Glass (ii) 
Nomex 
Glass 
Ground 
Glass (i) Load  
Turn to turn 
fretting Inter-turn short 
Ground glass 
high friction 
interface 
6 5 
Use of PTFE 
coated nomex top 
packer 
5 5 
Finger 
Blocks/Support 
Comb 
 
 
Finger blocks  
Winding 
Comb (i)    Cracks 
Cracking of winding 
comb & shearing of 
fixed bolts 
Inability to 
withstand 
imposed hoop 
stresses 
2 2 Introduce finger blocks 3 2 
Finger block 
fixing 
New finger block 
design no fixing 
holes 
Upper and lower 
fixing holes     Cracking 
Increased 
vibration/forging 
revalidation risk 
HCF/LCF/Starts 2 8 NDT Inspection  5 5 
D Lead 
Laminated 
flexible and relief 
machined Glass 
Tube Insulated 
Solid D lead, no 
machined relief, 
resin insulated 
    Electrical short Worst case rotor earth fault 
Insulation 
breakdown due to 
fretting 
8 8 
Full 
revalidation/repair 
during rotor 
refurbishments 
8 8 
Damper Link 
Type 
Cad Cu Ag 
Plated 
Glass Bead 
Peened Cad Cu Cu Cr Zr   Cracking 
Reduced neg 
sequence capability Fretting 1 8 Inspection at MO 1 3 
Damper link 
configuration 2+2 damper links 
Full+2 damper 
links 
Original 
26+2 
damper 
links 
   n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil End Relief Fully relieved Coil 1-8 
Limited relief 
Coils 1-4 only No relief    Coil fretting Rotor earth fault 
Breakdown in 
insulation system 7 7 
Original build 
quality 7 7 
H2 seal Type 
 
Face Type 
Double Flow    
Running 
Hours  
Degradation of 
sealing Hydrogen leakage Wear 3 5 
Inspection repair at 
mO/MO monitor 
seal temps gas 
replenishment rate 
2 3 
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Duvha Unit 3 Main Stator Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Features 
No Known Risk Low Risk Medium Risk 
High 
Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  Failure Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
Cause of Failure S D Repair/Mitigation W CoF 
Core End Packets 
Mark 3 
 
Mark 1, Mark 2   
Leading PF 
operation 
Overfluxing 
 Thermal fatigue Core fault Reduced cooling 6 9 Temp Cond Monitoring 10 8 
Core Tooth Splits Mark A, Mark B    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Plates Material Mark α, Mark β, Mark γ    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Plate 
Insulation 
Insuline 
Totanin 
Totanin/Red Oxide 
Wanin 
   None Known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Vent Spacers/Plates Mark D Mark A, Mark B, Mark C     
Local reduced 
cooling Overheating 
Local reduced 
cooling gas flow 2 5 None 5 4 
Screening Shield 
Form U shape 
Short L 
Extended L   
Leading PF 
operation  Overheating 
End of core 
Core fault 
Increased local 
heating due to 
eddie current 
losses 
2 5 Inspection, modified 
screening shield 5 4 
Screening Shielded 
Thickness (xx) mm    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Press Phan Material 
Press phan 
material at each 
end of core  
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Bars Insulated core bars Un-insulated 
core bars   Overfluxing  
Back of core 
burning Core melting 
Recirculating 
currents 2 5 
Monitor at outages find 
core fault root cause 5 4 
Spring Mounted 
Core 
Leaf Springs 
Tangential Rods 
Longitudinal  
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Cooling 
Axial 
Radial conventional 
Radial reverse flow 
Radial multipass 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Type Half Full    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Insulation Slot System 1-6    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Insulation 
Overhang System A-F    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Cooling 
Direct water go & 
return 
Direct water single 
pass 
Direct gas single 
pass 
Indirect gas 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Wedge Type 
Plain 
Plain with tapered 
slides 
Top hay with 
tapered slides 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
PTFE Hose Joints Flourocarbon 
rubber “O” rings 
Nitrile originals, 
fluorocarbon 
spares 
  Age  Failure of seal Leaks Relaxation 6 6 Material spec change 5 6 
Water Manifold 
Position 
FE & RE 
FE 
RE 
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Water Manifold 
Fixing 
Mounted on core 
Mounted on frame    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Manifold Balance 
Pipe 
 
PTFE hose Rigid pipe   Operating hours  
Gas into water 
leak 
Relaxation/ 
Fatigue 
Running hours 
high 
Cycle fatigue 
2 6 Mod to change to flexible hose 5 4 
Manifold Type 
(Stainless/copper & 
thickness) 
Stainless 
Thick copper 
(0.125’’) 
Medium copper Thin Cu    Gas into water leaks 
Relaxation/ 
Fatigue Fatigue 6 6  5 6 
Manifold Bellows  Controlled fitment 
Uncontrolled 
fitment   
Alignment 
sensitivity  
High cycle 
fatigue Gas into water Mis-alignment 6 6 Replace/realign 3 5 
Manifold Flanged 
Joints 
 
Fluorocarbon 
rubber “O” rings 
Nitrile originals, 
Fluorocarbon 
spares 
  Age  Failure of seal Leaks Relaxation 6 6 Material spec change 5 6 
Stator Coils Stainless steel 
 
Copper 
  
Chemical 
control  
Blockage of 
coolant 
channels with 
Cu oxide 
Overheating 
Cu oxide build up 
poor water 
chemistry 
6 9 Core bar change Chemical clean 7 8 
Hydrogen Cooler 
tube Supports Closed cell rubber 
 
Open cell 
rubber 
  Age  Breakdown of 
rubber inserts 
Tube vibrations 
Stator 
contamination 
Fatigue 1 1 
No repair possible. 
Clean up debris when 
possible 
3 2 
Winding Support 
Brackets Epoxy glass Permali   
Operating 
hours  Relaxation Wear/fretting Relaxation 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
years 8 9 
Phase Ring Position FE RE    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Type 
Multiconductor 
hollow 
Multiconductor 
solid 
Tube 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Cooling Direct water Indirect gas    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Ends & 
Droppers 
 Original design   Operating hours  
Gas into water 
leaks 
Relaxation/ 
fatigue 
High Cycle 
Fatigue 6 5 
MO inspections, tap 
testing 6 6 
Phase Conn 
Type/Supports Revised type 
Original/ Type 
(2)   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Inner Stator Jacking 
Studs 
Key plate 
reprofiled, jacking 
plate, full 
penetration weld. 
Original profile and 
original weld detail 
     
Looseness of 
inner stator 
jacking studs 
Fatigue/ fretting Relaxation 2 8 
MO checks on radial 
jacking load and NDT of 
keyplate/ jacking plate 
welds 
4 5 
Slot Wedges Original design/ Enhanced      Relaxation Wear/ fretting 
Material creep. 
Core vibration 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
yrs 8 9 
Endwinding Support 
Blades Blocked & 
Banded 
Blades Rings & 
Studs 
Full Core 
   
Operating 
hours  Relaxation Wear/ fretting 
Material creep.  
Core Vibration 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
yrs 8 9 
Endwinding 
Structure 
Wall papered 
Original design      Relaxation Fatigue/ fretting 
Operating Hrs 
High 
Cycle fatigue 
2 6 MO inspections 5 4 
Hydrogen Seal Type Face type Double flow    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
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Duvha Unit 3 Exciter Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Feature No known 
Risk Low Risk 
Medium 
Risk 
High 
Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  
Failure 
Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
Cause of Failure S 
Excitation 
Method 
Brushless Slip rings   Operating hours  
Slip ring 
wear 
Increased brush 
wear 
Operating 
hours/friction 2 
Rectification 
Type 
Rotating Mk 1 
Rotating Mk 2 
Static 
         
PMG Type Salient Pole Heteropolar     Relaxation Pole block looseness 
High Cycle 
Fatigue 2 
Main Exciter 
EWRR 18 Mn 18 Cr 
18 Mn 4 Cr 
  Moisture  Cracks Explosion of 
retaining ring 
Stress corrosion 
cracking 8 
Pedestals GEC Mitchell          
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Duvha Unit 4 Main Rotor Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Feature 
No Known Risk Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  Failure Mode 
Potential Effect(s) on 
Failure Cause of Failure S D 
Repair/ 
Mitigation W CoF 
Rotor Body 
Length 
Long (270’’) Short 
(260’’)      n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Forging 
Properties 
PS30/076>1982 PS30/076 1972-
1982 
PS30/076 
<1972    n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Winding Consolidated Coils 
Unconsolidated 
Coils   
Barring 
Hours  Electrical short 
Coil-coil-earth 
electrical breakdowns Fretting 3 8  1 4 
Rotor Shaft 
Diameter/fan 
splines  
Large 24’’ fan 
spline mod 8 fan 
splines 
Small 21’’ fan 
spline mod  
6 fan spline 
    Cracking 
Increased 
vibration/catastrophic 
failure 
High cycle fatigue 2 8  5 5 
Endwinding 
Retaining Ring 
Liner Material 
 
Nomex Asbestos 
or Kevlar Coated 
Epoxy Glass 
Asbestos (ii) 
Faced Epoxy 
Glass 
 Glass (i)   Electrical short Coil-coil-earth 
electrical breakdowns 
Tracking of Cu 
debris created by 
abrasion of top 
turns by glass 
fibres 
8 8 Use Nomex 
asbestos glass liner 8 8 
Top Cross Over  
Bottom Cross 
Over  
Turn to Turn 
Step Ups 
 
3b Oxygen Free 
Cu (i) Low Oxygen Content Cu 1a, 2b    
Hydrogen 
embrittlement 
Hydrogen 
embrittlement Oxcygen in Cu 7 7 
Replace with 
oxygen free copper 7 7 
Slot Cell 
Restraint 
Packing  
block mods and 
bonded slot cell 
Finger Block 
Insert with 
reinforcing 
dowels (iii) 
Finger 
Block 
Insert (ii) 
 
No Special 
Restraint (i)   
Migration of 
slot cells Earth fault 
Insufficient 
bonding and/or 
support, thermal 
expansion 
7 7 
Bonding of slot 
cells and/or packing 
block mods 
5 6 
Endwinding 
Retaining Ring 
Material 
 
18/18 (ii) 18/4 (i)   Moisture  Cracks Explosion of retaining 
ring 
Stress Corossion 
Cracking 8 7 
Replacement of 
18/18 rings 4 6 
Field Lead 
 
T Head ERM3A 
T Head CuCrMg 
Alloy 
T Head H,H Cu 
with lip 
L Head H,H Cu 
(i) with lip 
T Head 
H,H Cu 
L Head 
H,H Cu (i) 
Symmetrical 
radial 
connector  
  
Distortion and 
bending of field 
lead 
Distortion leading to 
cracking 
Prevailing 
bending moment 5 6 
Replace with T 
Head design 
(ERM3A) 
5 5 
Field Lead 
Riser Insulation 
 
Restraint lip 
machined into the 
riser 
 
No 
Restraint 
lip on 
Riser (i) 
 Load  
Degradation of 
insulation on 
riser as well as 
migration of 
insulation 
Loss of insulation No restraint lip 2 2 Machine restraint lip on riser 2 2 
Inter-turn 
Insulation  
 
Epoxy Glass Rub, Asbestos (ii) Nomex (i)  Time  
Degradation of 
insulation 
Paralysis and failure 
of insulation leading to 
shorted turns 
Cu particles 
puncturing 
insulation 
3 7 Replace with epoxy glass insulation 4 5 
Pole-pole 
flexible connect 
Restraint 
 
“Omega” Type 
Connection 
“L” Shaped with 
packing block 
Original 
“L” 
Shaped 
Support (i) 
 
Starts, 
Hours  
Distortion and 
subsequent 
cracking 
Worst case rotor Earth 
Fault 
“L” shape design 
unsuitable 5 6 
Replace with 
“omega” pole to 
pole connector 
3 5 
Endring Seating 
Arrangement 
 
Type 3 3 Land 
Type 2 2 Land 
(i) 
Type 1 
Screwed 
Ring 
 Starts  Cracks Cracking of dovetail load bearing flanks LCF 3 3 
3 land seating 
arrangement 6 4 
Packing Blocks Spigot mounted Finger Blocks      n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Restraint 
Design 
 
Axial Restraint 
No Axial 
Restraint     
Migration of 
packings Overheating 
Restricted cooling 
gas channels 3 5 
Use of lambchop 
packings 3 4 
Top Packer 
Finish 
 
PTFE coated 
Nomex 
PTFE Coated 
Glass (ii) 
Nomex 
Glass 
Ground 
Glass (i) Load  
Turn to turn 
fretting Inter-turn short 
Ground glass 
high friction 
interface 
4 3 
Use of PTFE 
coated nomex top 
packer 
3 3 
Finger 
Blocks/Support 
Comb 
 
 
Finger blocks  
Winding 
Comb (i)    Cracks 
Cracking of winding 
comb & shearing of 
fixed bolts 
Inability to 
withstand 
imposed hoop 
stresses 
2 2 Introduce finger blocks 3 2 
Finger block 
fixing 
New finger block 
design no fixing 
holes 
Upper and lower 
fixing holes     Cracking 
Increased 
vibration/forging 
revalidation risk 
HCF/LCF/Starts 2 8 NDT Inspection  5 5 
D Lead 
Laminated 
flexible and relief 
machined Glass 
Tube Insulated 
Solid D lead, no 
machined relief, 
resin insulated 
    Electrical short Worst case rotor earth fault 
Insulation 
breakdown due to 
fretting 
8 8 
Full 
revalidation/repair 
during rotor 
refurbishments 
8 8 
Damper Link 
Type 
Cad Cu Ag 
Plated 
Glass Bead 
Peened Cad Cu 
 
Cu Cr Zr   Cracking 
Reduced neg 
sequence capability Fretting 1 8 Inspection at MO 1 3 
Damper link 
configuration 2+2 damper links 
Full+2 damper 
links 
Original 
26+2 
damper 
links 
   n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil End Relief Fully relieved Coil 1-8 
Limited relief 
Coils 1-4 only No relief    Coil fretting Rotor earth fault 
Breakdown in 
insulation system 8 8 
Original build 
quality 8 8 
H2 seal Type 
 
Face Type 
Double Flow    
Running 
Hours  
Degradation of 
sealing Hydrogen leakage Wear 3 5 
Inspection repair at 
mO/MO monitor 
seal temps gas 
replenishment rate 
2 3 
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Duvha Unit 4 Main Stator Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Features 
No Known Risk Low Risk Medium Risk 
High 
Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  Failure Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
Cause of Failure S D Repair/Mitigation W CoF 
Core End Packets 
Mark 3 
 
Mark 1, Mark 2   
Leading PF 
operation 
Overfluxing 
 Thermal fatigue Core fault Reduced cooling 6 9 Temp Cond Monitoring 10 8 
Core Tooth Splits Mark A, Mark B    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Plates Material Mark α, Mark β, Mark γ    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Plate 
Insulation 
Insuline 
Totanin 
Totanin/Red Oxide 
Wanin 
   None Known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Vent Spacers/Plates Mark D Mark A, Mark B, Mark C     
Local reduced 
cooling Overheating 
Local reduced 
cooling gas flow 2 5 None 5 4 
Screening Shield 
Form U shape 
Short L 
Extended L   
Leading PF 
operation  Overheating 
End of core 
Core fault 
Increased local 
heating due to 
eddie current 
losses 
2 5 Inspection, modified 
screening shield 5 4 
Screening Shielded 
Thickness (xx) mm    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Press Phan Material 
Press phan 
material at each 
end of core  
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Bars Insulated core bars Un-insulated 
core bars   Overfluxing  
Back of core 
burning Core melting 
Recirculating 
currents 2 5 
Monitor at outages find 
core fault root cause 5 4 
Spring Mounted 
Core 
Leaf Springs 
Tangential Rods 
Longitudinal  
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Cooling 
Axial 
Radial conventional 
Radial reverse flow 
Radial multipass 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Type Half Full    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Insulation Slot System 1-6    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Insulation 
Overhang System A-F    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Cooling 
Direct water go & 
return 
Direct water single 
pass 
Direct gas single 
pass 
Indirect gas 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Wedge Type 
Plain 
Plain with tapered 
slides 
Top hay with 
tapered slides 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
PTFE Hose Joints Flourocarbon 
rubber “O” rings 
Nitrile originals, 
fluorocarbon 
spares 
  Age  Failure of seal Leaks Relaxation 6 6 Material spec change 5 6 
Water Manifold 
Position 
FE & RE 
FE 
RE 
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Water Manifold 
Fixing 
Mounted on core 
Mounted on frame    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Manifold Balance 
Pipe 
 
PTFE hose Rigid pipe   Operating hours  
Gas into water 
leak 
Relaxation/ 
Fatigue 
Running hours 
high 
Cycle fatigue 
2 6 Mod to change to flexible hose 5 4 
Manifold Type 
(Stainless/copper & 
thickness) 
Stainless 
Thick copper 
(0.125’’) 
Medium copper Thin Cu    Gas into water leaks 
Relaxation/ 
Fatigue Fatigue 6 6  5 6 
Manifold Bellows  Controlled fitment 
Uncontrolled 
fitment   
Alignment 
sensitivity  
High cycle 
fatigue Gas into water Mis-alignment 6 6 Replace/realign 3 5 
Manifold Flanged 
Joints 
Fluorocarbon 
rubber “O” rings 
Nitrile originals, 
Fluorocarbon 
spares 
  Age  Failure of seal Leaks Relaxation 6 6 Material spec change 5 6 
Stator Coils Stainless steel 
 
Copper 
  
Chemical 
control  
Blockage of 
coolant 
channels with 
Cu oxide 
Overheating 
Cu oxide build up 
poor water 
chemistry 
6 9 Core bar change Chemical clean 7 8 
Hydrogen Cooler 
tube Supports Closed cell rubber 
 
Open cell 
rubber 
  Age  Breakdown of 
rubber inserts 
Tube vibrations 
Stator 
contamination 
Fatigue 1 1 
No repair possible. 
Clean up debris when 
possible 
3 2 
Winding Support 
Brackets Epoxy glass Permali   
Operating 
hours  Relaxation Wear/fretting Relaxation 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
years 8 9 
Phase Ring Position FE RE    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Type 
Multiconductor 
hollow 
Multiconductor 
solid 
Tube 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Cooling Direct water Indirect gas    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Ends & 
Droppers 
 Original design   Operating hours  
Gas into water 
leaks 
Relaxation/ 
fatigue 
High Cycle 
Fatigue 6 5 
MO inspections, tap 
testing 6 6 
Phase Conn 
Type/Supports Revised type 
Original/ Type 
(2)   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Inner Stator Jacking 
Studs 
Key plate 
reprofiled, jacking 
plate, full 
penetration weld. 
Original profile and 
original weld detail 
     
Looseness of 
inner stator 
jacking studs 
Fatigue/ fretting Relaxation 2 8 
MO checks on radial 
jacking load and NDT of 
keyplate/ jacking plate 
welds 
4 5 
Slot Wedges Original design/ Enhanced      Relaxation Wear/ fretting 
Material creep. 
Core vibration 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
yrs 8 9 
Endwinding Support 
Blades Blocked & 
Banded 
Blades Rings & 
Studs 
Full Core 
   
Operating 
hours  Relaxation Wear/ fretting 
Material creep.  
Core Vibration 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
yrs 8 9 
Endwinding 
Structure 
Wall papered 
Original design      Relaxation Fatigue/ fretting 
Operating Hrs 
High 
Cycle fatigue 
2 6 MO inspections 5 4 
Hydrogen Seal Type Face type Double flow    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
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Duvha Unit 4 Exciter Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Feature No known 
Risk Low Risk 
Medium 
Risk 
High 
Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  
Failure 
Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
Cause of Failure S 
Excitation 
Method 
Brushless Slip rings   Operating hours  
Slip ring 
wear 
Increased brush 
wear 
Operating 
hours/friction 2 
Rectification 
Type 
Rotating Mk 1 
Rotating Mk 2 
Static 
         
PMG Type Salient Pole Heteropolar     Relaxation Pole block looseness 
High Cycle 
Fatigue 2 
Main Exciter 
EWRR 
18 Mn 18 Cr 18 Mn 4 Cr   Moisture  Cracks Explosion of 
retaining ring 
Stress corrosion 
cracking 8 
Pedestals GEC Mitchell          
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Duvha Unit 5 Main Rotor Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Feature 
No Known Risk Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  Failure Mode 
Potential Effect(s) on 
Failure Cause of Failure S D 
Repair/ 
Mitigation W CoF 
Rotor Body 
Length 
Long (270’’) Short 
(260’’)      n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Forging 
Properties 
PS30/076>1982 PS30/076 1972-
1982 
PS30/076 
<1972    n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Winding Consolidated Coils 
Unconsolidated 
Coils   
Barring 
Hours  Electrical short 
Coil-coil-earth 
electrical breakdowns Fretting 3 8  1 4 
Rotor Shaft 
Diameter/fan 
splines  
Large 24’’ fan 
spline mod 8 fan 
splines 
Small 21’’ fan 
spline mod  
6 fan spline 
    Cracking 
Increased 
vibration/catastrophic 
failure 
High cycle fatigue 2 8  5 5 
Endwinding 
Retaining Ring 
Liner Material 
 
Nomex Asbestos 
or Kevlar Coated 
Epoxy Glass 
Asbestos (ii) 
Faced Epoxy 
Glass 
 Glass (i)   Electrical short Coil-coil-earth 
electrical breakdowns 
Tracking of Cu 
debris created by 
abrasion of top 
turns by glass 
fibres 
8 8 Use Nomex 
asbestos glass liner 8 8 
Top Cross Over  
Bottom Cross 
Over  
Turn to Turn 
Step Ups 
 
3b Oxygen Free 
Cu (i) Low Oxygen Content Cu 1a, 2b    
Hydrogen 
embrittlement 
Hydrogen 
embrittlement Oxcygen in Cu 7 7 
Replace with 
oxygen free copper 7 7 
Slot Cell 
Restraint 
Packing  
block mods and 
bonded slot cell 
Finger Block 
Insert with 
reinforcing 
dowels (iii) 
Finger 
Block 
Insert (ii) 
No Special 
Restraint (i)   
Migration of 
slot cells Earth fault 
Insufficient 
bonding and/or 
support, thermal 
expansion 
7 7 
Bonding of slot 
cells and/or packing 
block mods 
5 6 
Endwinding 
Retaining Ring 
Material 
 
18/18 (ii) 18/4 (i)   Moisture  Cracks Explosion of retaining 
ring 
Stress Corossion 
Cracking 8 7 
Replacement of 
18/18 rings 4 6 
Field Lead 
 
T Head ERM3A 
T Head CuCrMg 
Alloy 
T Head H,H Cu 
with lip 
L Head H,H Cu 
(i) with lip 
T Head 
H,H Cu 
L Head 
H,H Cu (i) 
Symmetrical 
radial 
connector  
  
Distortion and 
bending of field 
lead 
Distortion leading to 
cracking 
Prevailing 
bending moment 5 6 
Replace with T 
Head design 
(ERM3A) 
5 5 
Field Lead 
Riser Insulation 
 
Restraint lip 
machined into the 
riser 
 
No 
Restraint 
lip on 
Riser (i) 
 Load  
Degradation of 
insulation on 
riser as well as 
migration of 
insulation 
Loss of insulation No restraint lip 2 2 Machine restraint lip on riser 2 2 
Inter-turn 
Insulation  
 
Epoxy Glass 
Rub, Asbestos 
(ii) Nomex (i)  Time  Degradation of insulation 
Paralysis and failure 
of insulation leading to 
shorted turns 
Cu particles 
puncturing 
insulation 
3 7 Replace with epoxy glass insulation 4 5 
Pole-pole 
flexible connect 
Restraint 
 
“Omega” Type 
Connection 
“L” Shaped with 
packing block 
Original 
“L” 
Shaped 
Support (i) 
 
Starts, 
Hours  
Distortion and 
subsequent 
cracking 
Worst case rotor Earth 
Fault 
“L” shape design 
unsuitable 5 6 
Replace with 
“omega” pole to 
pole connector 
3 5 
Endring Seating 
Arrangement 
 
Type 3 3 Land Type 2 2 Land (i) 
Type 1 
Screwed 
Ring 
 Starts  Cracks Cracking of dovetail load bearing flanks LCF 3 3 
3 land seating 
arrangement 6 4 
Packing Blocks Spigot mounted Finger Blocks      n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Restraint 
Design 
 
Axial Restraint 
No Axial 
Restraint     
Migration of 
packings Overheating 
Restricted cooling 
gas channels 3 5 
Use of lambchop 
packings 3 4 
Top Packer 
Finish 
 
PTFE coated 
Nomex 
PTFE Coated 
Glass (ii) 
Nomex 
Glass 
Ground 
Glass (i) Load  
Turn to turn 
fretting Inter-turn short 
Ground glass 
high friction 
interface 
4 3 
Use of PTFE 
coated nomex top 
packer 
3 3 
Finger 
Blocks/Support 
Comb 
 
 
Finger blocks  
Winding 
Comb (i)    Cracks 
Cracking of winding 
comb & shearing of 
fixed bolts 
Inability to 
withstand 
imposed hoop 
stresses 
2 2 Introduce finger blocks 3 2 
Finger block 
fixing 
New finger block 
design no fixing 
holes 
Upper and lower 
fixing holes     Cracking 
Increased 
vibration/forging 
revalidation risk 
HCF/LCF/Starts 2 8 NDT Inspection  5 5 
D Lead 
Laminated 
flexible and relief 
machined Glass 
Tube Insulated 
Solid D lead, no 
machined relief, 
resin insulated 
    Electrical short Worst case rotor earth fault 
Insulation 
breakdown due to 
fretting 
8 8 
Full 
revalidation/repair 
during rotor 
refurbishments 
8 8 
Damper Link 
Type 
Cad Cu Ag 
Plated 
Glass Bead 
Peened Cad Cu 
 
Cu Cr Zr   Cracking 
Reduced neg 
sequence capability Fretting 1 8 Inspection at MO 1 3 
Damper link 
configuration 2+2 damper links 
Full+2 damper 
links 
Original 
26+2 
damper 
links 
   n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil End Relief Fully relieved Coil 1-8 
Limited relief 
Coils 1-4 only No relief    Coil fretting Rotor earth fault 
Breakdown in 
insulation system 8 8 
Original build 
quality 8 8 
H2 seal Type 
 
Face Type 
Double Flow    
Running 
Hours  
Degradation of 
sealing Hydrogen leakage Wear 3 5 
Inspection repair at 
mO/MO monitor 
seal temps gas 
replenishment rate 
2 3 
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Duvha Unit 5 Main Stator Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Features 
No Known Risk Low Risk Medium Risk 
High 
Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  Failure Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
Cause of Failure S D Repair/Mitigation W CoF 
Core End Packets 
Mark 3 
 
Mark 1, Mark 2   
Leading PF 
operation 
Overfluxing 
 Thermal fatigue Core fault Reduced cooling 6 9 Temp Cond Monitoring 10 8 
Core Tooth Splits Mark A, Mark B    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Plates Material Mark α, Mark β, Mark γ    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Plate 
Insulation 
Insuline 
Totanin 
Totanin/Red Oxide 
Wanin 
   None Known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Vent Spacers/Plates Mark D Mark A, Mark B, Mark C     
Local reduced 
cooling Overheating 
Local reduced 
cooling gas flow 2 5 None 5 4 
Screening Shield 
Form U shape 
Short L 
Extended L   
Leading PF 
operation  Overheating 
End of core 
Core fault 
Increased local 
heating due to 
eddie current 
losses 
2 5 Inspection, modified 
screening shield 5 4 
Screening Shielded 
Thickness (xx) mm    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Press Phan Material 
Press phan 
material at each 
end of core  
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Bars Insulated core bars Un-insulated 
core bars   Overfluxing  
Back of core 
burning Core melting 
Recirculating 
currents 2 5 
Monitor at outages find 
core fault root cause 5 4 
Spring Mounted 
Core 
Leaf Springs 
Tangential Rods 
Longitudinal  
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Cooling 
Axial 
Radial conventional 
Radial reverse flow 
Radial multipass 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Type Half Full    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Insulation Slot System 1-6    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Insulation 
Overhang System A-F    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Cooling 
Direct water go & 
return 
Direct water single 
pass 
Direct gas single 
pass 
Indirect gas 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Wedge Type 
Plain 
Plain with tapered 
slides 
Top hay with 
tapered slides 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
PTFE Hose Joints Flourocarbon 
rubber “O” rings 
Nitrile originals, 
fluorocarbon 
spares 
  Age  Failure of seal Leaks Relaxation 6 6 Material spec change 5 6 
Water Manifold 
Position 
FE & RE 
FE 
RE 
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Water Manifold 
Fixing 
Mounted on core 
Mounted on frame    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Manifold Balance 
Pipe 
 
PTFE hose Rigid pipe   Operating hours  
Gas into water 
leak 
Relaxation/ 
Fatigue 
Running hours 
high 
Cycle fatigue 
2 6 Mod to change to flexible hose 5 4 
Manifold Type 
(Stainless/copper & 
thickness) 
Stainless 
Thick copper 
(0.125’’) 
Medium copper Thin Cu    Gas into water leaks 
Relaxation/ 
Fatigue Fatigue 6 6  5 6 
Manifold Bellows  Controlled fitment 
Uncontrolled 
fitment   
Alignment 
sensitivity  
High cycle 
fatigue Gas into water Mis-alignment 6 6 Replace/realign 3 5 
Manifold Flanged 
Joints 
Fluorocarbon 
rubber “O” rings 
Nitrile originals, 
Fluorocarbon 
spares 
  Age  Failure of seal Leaks Relaxation 6 6 Material spec change 5 6 
Stator Coils Stainless steel 
 
Copper 
  
Chemical 
control  
Blockage of 
coolant 
channels with 
Cu oxide 
Overheating 
Cu oxide build up 
poor water 
chemistry 
6 9 Core bar change Chemical clean 7 8 
Hydrogen Cooler 
tube Supports Closed cell rubber 
 
Open cell 
rubber 
  Age  Breakdown of 
rubber inserts 
Tube vibrations 
Stator 
contamination 
Fatigue 1 1 
No repair possible. 
Clean up debris when 
possible 
3 2 
Winding Support 
Brackets Epoxy glass Permali   
Operating 
hours  Relaxation Wear/fretting Relaxation 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
years 8 9 
Phase Ring Position FE RE    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Type 
Multiconductor 
hollow 
Multiconductor 
solid 
Tube 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Cooling Direct water Indirect gas    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Ends & 
Droppers 
 Original design   Operating hours  
Gas into water 
leaks 
Relaxation/ 
fatigue 
High Cycle 
Fatigue 6 5 
MO inspections, tap 
testing 6 6 
Phase Conn 
Type/Supports Revised type 
Original/ Type 
(2)   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Inner Stator Jacking 
Studs 
Key plate 
reprofiled, jacking 
plate, full 
penetration weld. 
Original profile and 
original weld detail 
     
Looseness of 
inner stator 
jacking studs 
Fatigue/ fretting Relaxation 2 8 
MO checks on radial 
jacking load and NDT of 
keyplate/ jacking plate 
welds 
4 5 
Slot Wedges Original design/ Enhanced      Relaxation Wear/ fretting 
Material creep. 
Core vibration 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
yrs 8 9 
Endwinding Support 
Blades Blocked & 
Banded 
Blades Rings & 
Studs 
Full Core 
   
Operating 
hours  Relaxation Wear/ fretting 
Material creep.  
Core Vibration 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
yrs 8 9 
Endwinding 
Structure 
Wall papered 
Original design      Relaxation Fatigue/ fretting 
Operating Hrs 
High 
Cycle fatigue 
2 6 MO inspections 5 4 
Hydrogen Seal Type Face type Double flow    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
 
 
 
 
 
 Kamal K.D. Makan 9607058T  106 
   
 
Duvha Unit 5 Exciter Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Feature No known 
Risk Low Risk 
Medium 
Risk 
High 
Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  
Failure 
Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
Cause of Failure S 
Excitation 
Method 
Brushless Slip rings   Operating hours  
Slip ring 
wear 
Increased brush 
wear 
Operating 
hours/friction 2 
Rectification 
Type 
Rotating Mk 1 
Rotating Mk 2 
Static 
         
PMG Type Salient Pole Heteropolar     Relaxation Pole block looseness 
High Cycle 
Fatigue 2 
Main Exciter 
EWRR 
18 Mn 18 Cr 18 Mn 4 Cr   Moisture  Cracks Explosion of 
retaining ring 
Stress corrosion 
cracking 8 
Pedestals GEC Mitchell          
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Duvha Unit 6 Main Rotor Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Feature 
No Known Risk Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  Failure Mode 
Potential Effect(s) on 
Failure Cause of Failure S D 
Repair/ 
Mitigation W CoF 
Rotor Body 
Length 
Long (270’’) Short 
(260’’)      n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Forging 
Properties 
PS30/076>1982 PS30/076 1972-
1982 
PS30/076 
<1972    n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Winding Consolidated Coils 
Unconsolidated 
Coils   
Barring 
Hours  Electrical short 
Coil-coil-earth 
electrical breakdowns Fretting 3 8  1 4 
Rotor Shaft 
Diameter/fan 
splines  
Large 24’’ fan 
spline mod 8 fan 
splines 
Small 21’’ fan 
spline mod  
6 fan spline 
    Cracking 
Increased 
vibration/catastrophic 
failure 
High cycle fatigue 2 8  5 5 
Endwinding 
Retaining Ring 
Liner Material 
 
Nomex Asbestos 
or Kevlar Coated 
Epoxy Glass 
Asbestos (ii) 
Faced Epoxy 
Glass 
 Glass (i)   Electrical short Coil-coil-earth 
electrical breakdowns 
Tracking of Cu 
debris created by 
abrasion of top 
turns by glass 
fibres 
8 8 Use Nomex 
asbestos glass liner 8 8 
Top Cross Over  
Bottom Cross 
Over  
Turn to Turn 
Step Ups 
 
3b Oxygen Free 
Cu (i) 
Low Oxygen 
Content Cu 
1a, 2b    Hydrogen 
embrittlement 
Hydrogen 
embrittlement Oxcygen in Cu 7 7 
Replace with 
oxygen free copper 7 7 
Slot Cell 
Restraint 
Packing  
block mods and 
bonded slot cell 
Finger Block 
Insert with 
reinforcing 
dowels (iii) 
Finger 
Block 
Insert (ii) 
No Special 
Restraint (i)   
Migration of 
slot cells Earth fault 
Insufficient 
bonding and/or 
support, thermal 
expansion 
7 7 
Bonding of slot 
cells and/or packing 
block mods 
5 6 
Endwinding 
Retaining Ring 
Material 
 
18/18 (ii) 
18/4 (i) 
  Moisture  Cracks Explosion of retaining 
ring 
Stress Corossion 
Cracking 8 7 
Replacement of 
18/18 rings 4 6 
Field Lead 
 
T Head ERM3A 
T Head CuCrMg 
Alloy 
T Head H,H Cu 
with lip 
L Head H,H Cu 
(i) with lip 
T Head 
H,H Cu 
L Head 
H,H Cu (i) 
Symmetrical 
radial 
connector  
  
Distortion and 
bending of field 
lead 
Distortion leading to 
cracking 
Prevailing 
bending moment 5 6 
Replace with T 
Head design 
(ERM3A) 
5 5 
Field Lead 
Riser Insulation 
 
Restraint lip 
machined into the 
riser 
 
No 
Restraint 
lip on 
Riser (i) 
 Load  
Degradation of 
insulation on 
riser as well as 
migration of 
insulation 
Loss of insulation No restraint lip 2 2 Machine restraint lip on riser 2 2 
Inter-turn 
Insulation  
 
Epoxy Glass Rub, Asbestos (ii) Nomex (i)  Time  
Degradation of 
insulation 
Paralysis and failure 
of insulation leading to 
shorted turns 
Cu particles 
puncturing 
insulation 
3 7 Replace with epoxy glass insulation 4 5 
Pole-pole 
flexible connect 
Restraint 
 
“Omega” Type 
Connection 
“L” Shaped with 
packing block 
Original 
“L” 
Shaped 
Support (i) 
 
Starts, 
Hours  
Distortion and 
subsequent 
cracking 
Worst case rotor Earth 
Fault 
“L” shape design 
unsuitable 5 6 
Replace with 
“omega” pole to 
pole connector 
3 5 
Endring Seating 
Arrangement 
 
Type 3 3 Land Type 2 2 Land (i) 
Type 1 
Screwed 
Ring 
 Starts  Cracks Cracking of dovetail load bearing flanks LCF 3 3 
3 land seating 
arrangement 6 4 
Packing Blocks Spigot mounted Finger Blocks      n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Restraint 
Design 
 
Axial Restraint 
No Axial 
Restraint     
Migration of 
packings Overheating 
Restricted cooling 
gas channels 3 5 
Use of lambchop 
packings 3 4 
Top Packer 
Finish 
 
PTFE coated 
Nomex 
PTFE Coated 
Glass (ii) 
Nomex 
Glass 
Ground 
Glass (i) Load  
Turn to turn 
fretting Inter-turn short 
Ground glass 
high friction 
interface 
4 3 
Use of PTFE 
coated nomex top 
packer 
3 3 
Finger 
Blocks/Support 
Comb 
 
 
Finger blocks  
Winding 
Comb (i)    Cracks 
Cracking of winding 
comb & shearing of 
fixed bolts 
Inability to 
withstand 
imposed hoop 
stresses 
2 2 Introduce finger blocks 3 2 
Finger block 
fixing 
New finger block 
design no fixing 
holes 
Upper and lower 
fixing holes     Cracking 
Increased 
vibration/forging 
revalidation risk 
HCF/LCF/Starts 2 8 NDT Inspection  5 5 
D Lead 
Laminated 
flexible and relief 
machined Glass 
Tube Insulated 
Solid D lead, no 
machined relief, 
resin insulated 
    Electrical short Worst case rotor earth fault 
Insulation 
breakdown due to 
fretting 
8 8 
Full 
revalidation/repair 
during rotor 
refurbishments 
8 8 
Damper Link 
Type 
Cad Cu Ag 
Plated 
Glass Bead 
Peened 
 
Cad Cu Cu Cr Zr   Cracking 
Reduced neg 
sequence capability Fretting 1 8 Inspection at MO 1 3 
Damper link 
configuration 2+2 damper links 
Full+2 damper 
links 
Original 
26+2 
damper 
links 
   n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil End Relief Fully relieved Coil 1-8 
Limited relief 
Coils 1-4 only No relief    Coil fretting Rotor earth fault 
Breakdown in 
insulation system 8 8 
Original build 
quality 8 8 
H2 seal Type 
 
Face Type 
Double Flow    
Running 
Hours  
Degradation of 
sealing Hydrogen leakage Wear 3 5 
Inspection repair at 
mO/MO monitor 
seal temps gas 
replenishment rate 
2 3 
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Duvha Unit 6 Main Stator Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Features 
No Known Risk Low Risk Medium Risk 
High 
Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  Failure Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
Cause of Failure S D Repair/Mitigation W CoF 
Core End Packets 
Mark 3 
 
Mark 1, Mark 2   
Leading PF 
operation 
Overfluxing 
 Thermal fatigue Core fault Reduced cooling 6 9 Temp Cond Monitoring 10 8 
Core Tooth Splits Mark A, Mark B    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Plates Material Mark α, Mark β, Mark γ    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Plate 
Insulation 
Insuline 
Totanin 
Totanin/Red Oxide 
Wanin 
   None Known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Vent Spacers/Plates Mark D Mark A, Mark B, Mark C     
Local reduced 
cooling Overheating 
Local reduced 
cooling gas flow 2 5 None 5 4 
Screening Shield 
Form U shape 
Short L 
Extended L   
Leading PF 
operation  Overheating 
End of core 
Core fault 
Increased local 
heating due to 
eddie current 
losses 
2 5 Inspection, modified 
screening shield 5 4 
Screening Shielded 
Thickness (xx) mm    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Press Phan Material 
Press phan 
material at each 
end of core  
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Bars Insulated core bars Un-insulated 
core bars   Overfluxing  
Back of core 
burning Core melting 
Recirculating 
currents 2 5 
Monitor at outages find 
core fault root cause 5 4 
Spring Mounted 
Core 
Leaf Springs 
Tangential Rods 
Longitudinal  
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Core Cooling 
Axial 
Radial conventional 
Radial reverse flow 
Radial multipass 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Type Half Full    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Insulation Slot System 1-6    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Insulation 
Overhang System A-F    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Coil Cooling 
Direct water go & 
return 
Direct water single 
pass 
Direct gas single 
pass 
Indirect gas 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Wedge Type 
Plain 
Plain with tapered 
slides 
Top hay with 
tapered slides 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
PTFE Hose Joints Flourocarbon 
rubber “O” rings 
Nitrile originals, 
fluorocarbon 
spares 
  Age  Failure of seal Leaks Relaxation 6 6 Material spec change 5 6 
Water Manifold 
Position 
FE & RE 
FE 
RE 
None 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Water Manifold 
Fixing 
Mounted on core 
Mounted on frame    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Manifold Balance 
Pipe 
 
PTFE hose Rigid pipe   Operating hours  
Gas into water 
leak 
Relaxation/ 
Fatigue 
Running hours 
high 
Cycle fatigue 
2 6 Mod to change to flexible hose 5 4 
Manifold Type 
(Stainless/copper & 
thickness) 
Stainless 
Thick copper 
(0.125’’) 
Medium copper Thin Cu    Gas into water leaks 
Relaxation/ 
Fatigue Fatigue 6 6  5 6 
Manifold Bellows  Controlled fitment 
Uncontrolled 
fitment   
Alignment 
sensitivity  
High cycle 
fatigue Gas into water Mis-alignment 6 6 Replace/realign 3 5 
Manifold Flanged 
Joints 
Fluorocarbon 
rubber “O” rings 
Nitrile originals, 
Fluorocarbon 
spares 
  Age  Failure of seal Leaks Relaxation 6 6 Material spec change 5 6 
Stator Coils Stainless steel 
 
Copper 
  
Chemical 
control  
Blockage of 
coolant 
channels with 
Cu oxide 
Overheating 
Cu oxide build up 
poor water 
chemistry 
6 9 Core bar change Chemical clean 7 8 
Hydrogen Cooler 
tube Supports Closed cell rubber 
 
Open cell 
rubber 
  Age  Breakdown of 
rubber inserts 
Tube vibrations 
Stator 
contamination 
Fatigue 1 1 
No repair possible. 
Clean up debris when 
possible 
3 2 
Winding Support 
Brackets Epoxy glass Permali   
Operating 
hours  Relaxation Wear/fretting Relaxation 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
years 8 9 
Phase Ring Position FE RE    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Type 
Multiconductor 
hollow 
Multiconductor 
solid 
Tube 
   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Cooling Direct water Indirect gas    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Phase Ring Ends & 
Droppers 
 Original design   Operating hours  
Gas into water 
leaks 
Relaxation/ 
fatigue 
High Cycle 
Fatigue 6 5 
MO inspections, tap 
testing 6 6 
Phase Conn 
Type/Supports Revised type 
Original/ Type 
(2)   None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
Inner Stator Jacking 
Studs 
Key plate 
reprofiled, jacking 
plate, full 
penetration weld. 
Original profile and 
original weld detail 
     
Looseness of 
inner stator 
jacking studs 
Fatigue/ fretting Relaxation 2 8 
MO checks on radial 
jacking load and NDT of 
keyplate/ jacking plate 
welds 
4 5 
Slot Wedges Original design/ Enhanced      Relaxation Wear/ fretting 
Material creep. 
Core vibration 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
yrs 8 9 
Endwinding Support 
Blades Blocked & 
Banded 
Blades Rings & 
Studs 
Full Core 
   
Operating 
hours  Relaxation Wear/ fretting 
Material creep.  
Core Vibration 10 9 
MO inspection every 6 
yrs 8 9 
Endwinding 
Structure 
Wall papered 
Original design      Relaxation Fatigue/ fretting 
Operating Hrs 
High 
Cycle fatigue 
2 6 MO inspections 5 4 
Hydrogen Seal Type Face type Double flow    None known  n/a n/a n/a   n/a   
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Duvha Unit 6 Exciter Features 
Risk of Failure 
0 1 2 3 Feature No known 
Risk Low Risk 
Medium 
Risk 
High 
Risk 
Failure 
Drivers  
Failure 
Mode 
Potential 
Effect(s) of 
Failure 
Cause of Failure S 
Excitation 
Method 
Brushless Slip rings   Operating hours  
Slip ring 
wear 
Increased brush 
wear 
Operating 
hours/friction 2 
Rectification 
Type 
Rotating Mk 1 
Rotating Mk 2 
Static 
         
PMG Type Salient Pole Heteropolar     Relaxation Pole block looseness 
High Cycle 
Fatigue 2 
Main Exciter 
EWRR 
18 Mn 18 Cr 18 Mn 4 Cr   Moisture  Cracks Explosion of 
retaining ring 
Stress corrosion 
cracking 8 
Pedestals GEC Mitchell          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
